ADHD and Reasoning Performance:  Bridging the Gap between Science and the Classroom by Gibb, Maia K.G. 1962-
  
 
 
ADHD and Reasoning Performance: 
Bridging the Gap between Science and the Classroom 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Education 
In the Department of Educational Psychology and Special Education 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
 
Maia K.G. Gibb 
 
 
 
 
  
 Copyright Maia K.G. Gibb, May, 2016. All rights reserved. 
i 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this 
thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by 
the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by 
the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is 
understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use 
which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation. 
 
Request for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis in whole or in part 
should be addressed to:  
 
Department Head, Educational Psychology and Special Education 
College of Education 
University of Saskatchewan 
28 Campus Drive 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  S7N 0X1  Canada 
 
OR 
 
 
Dean 
College of Graduate Studies and Research 
University of Saskatchewan 
107 Administration Place 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  S7N 5A2 Canada 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Decision errors occur because faster, Type 1 processes supply an autonomous dominant response 
founded on beliefs that can be difficult to inhibit and override by slower Type 2 processes 
correlated with more rational thinking.  ADHD is widely associated with primary deficits in 
inhibitory control (Barkley, 1997), a central executive mechanism that plays a principal role in 
analytic thinking.  Differences in reasoning abilities between university students with ADHD (n 
= 64) and without (n = 64) were measured by asking both groups to solve 24 base-rate problems 
(12 conflict, 12 non-conflict) that included a response instruction manipulation of answering 
either with “beliefs” or “statistics.”  Participants also completed the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT), a three-item problem-solving task that cues an intuitive, yet erroneous, response that 
must be inhibited and overruled to provide a correct answer.  Surprisingly, accuracy rates for 
ADHD participants on the CRT task matched that of controls.  Similarly, ADHD participants 
performed equal to or better than controls on base-rate problems thought to require inhibitory 
control.  The pattern of response times for both study tasks suggests that the acknowledged 
inhibitory deficits in ADHD may manifest themselves in response latencies.  Thus, despite 
similar or better accuracy rates, ADHD reasoners required extended time to overcome inhibitory 
deficits.  A further finding was that on base-rate problems solved with beliefs, on conflict and 
non-conflict problems, the ADHD group required significantly longer to encode the lengthy 
personality descriptions.  Likely this is due to inefficient working memory systems, strongly 
associated with ADHD, that hamper the ability to temporarily store and manipulate information 
(Holmes et al., 2014).  Altogether, these findings have implications for classroom instruction for 
students with ADHD and may assist with developing effective pedagogies to provide a positive 
and rewarding learning experience for students with diverse learning needs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapid advances in modern technology and innovations in science have provided us with a 
comprehensive understanding of the brain’s interactive functioning in learning, cognition, and 
neurological processing.  Collaborative research in neuroscience, psychology, and pedagogy has 
advanced our understanding of how the brain learns best and identified obstacles to learning.  
Mind, brain, and education science1 is the “new” brain-based education that is spurring a radical 
shift in how we think about education and how we teach our students (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 
2011).  Why is this necessary?  Tokuhama-Espinosa explains that students’ complex learning 
needs may not be addressed successfully through pedagogical approaches alone.  The “new 
science” of teaching and learning has integrated knowledge from fields of neuroscience, 
psychology, and education, and applied this expertise to the school setting.  Pedagogical 
advances, innovative teaching, and optimization of learning conditions are a natural corollary of 
multidisciplinary research that supports all types of learners (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2011), 
including those with disorders that impair executive functioning, such as attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). 
ADHD as a Neurodevelopmental Disorder  
Since its initial depiction in medical literature as an “abnormal defect of moral control in 
children” (Still, 1902), what we now identify as ADHD was described for decades as simply a 
disruptive behavioural disorder commonly seen in boys (Brown, 2013).  Major changes in the 
conceptualization of ADHD came in the 1980s when, despite still being classified as a 
behavioural disorder, the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980) attached the designation of 
“attention deficit disorder” (ADD) to highlight attentional impairments.  Further modifications in 
the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) resulted in a name change to that of ADHD and established the three 
subtypes used by health care professionals today: combined type ADHD-C; predominantly 
inattentive type ADHD-I; and predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type ADHD-H.  In 2013, the 
DSM-5 reclassified ADHD from a behavioural disorder to a neurodevelopment disorder (APA, 
2013).  While we have come far in understanding more about this disorder, there is still much to 
                                                 
1 Items in italics indicate the item is listed in the Definition of Terms (pp. 7-10) 
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be learned about the differentiated subtypes, their biological basis, and the negative 
consequences on meta-cognitive processes that regulate reasoning, and decision-making. 
The classification of ADHD subtypes is still being actively debated.  For example, 
researchers argue that subtypes ADHD-H (typically diagnosed between 3-4 years; Applegate et 
al., 1997) and ADHD-C (commonly diagnosed between ages 5 and 8) may simply be 
developmental stages of the same disorder (Barkley, 1997a, 1997b, 2006; Nigg & Barkley, 
2014).  ADHD-I symptoms of selective attention deficits and sluggish cognitive processing may 
actually be related to “impaired working memory and not of perceptual, filtering, and selection 
(input) problems” (Barkley, 2003a, p. 78, 2003b, p. 77, but see also Barkley, 1997a), although 
the exact neurobiological deficits remain unknown (Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  It currently remains 
unclear whether this inattentive subtype has distinct deficits (Barkley, 1997b; Carlson & Mann, 
2000).  Some argue for ADHD-I to be classified as being a unique disorder from ADHD 
(Barkley, 2001, 2006; Carr, Henderson, & Nigg, 2010; Milich, Ballentine, & Lynam, 2001).  
Although ADHD has benefitted from a plethora of research, there remains much that we do not 
know about the various subtypes and their origins. 
Most neuropsychologists agree that, on a biological basis, those with ADHD have 
difficulty managing impulses, controlling movement, sustaining attention, and engaging in self-
disciplined behaviour.  Yet controversy continues regarding the biological cause and 
neuropsychological impairments associated with ADHD.  Research employing factor analysis 
(Burns, Boe, Walsh, Sommers-Flanagan, & Teegarden, 2001) has identified two qualitatively 
different core behavioural dimensions underlying the various symptoms thought to characterize 
ADHD– one driven by inattention (ADHD-I), the other driven by hyperactivity-impulsivity 
(ADHD-H).  The focus of this paper is on the more dominant manifestation of the disorder, that 
of the combined type ADHD (ADHD-C), a combination of ADHD-I and ADHD-H.  Those with 
ADHD-C are thought to have significant deficits in behavioural inhibition and inattention (the 
executive functions) that are critical for effective self-regulation and behavioural inhibition 
(Barkley, 1997b; for a review, see Nigg & Barkley, 2014).   
Although the current DSM-5 continues to emphasize the behavioural symptoms of 
inattention in its diagnostic criteria, emerging literature provides strong evidence that impairment 
in self-regulation and executive functioning offer a better explanation of impairment in ADHD 
(Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  Researchers and clinicians could benefit from examining ADHD from 
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a cognitive and neuropsychological perspective.  Converging lines of research, including 
measures of physiological functioning, laboratory tests, and neuroimaging studies increasingly 
support disinhibition as a core deficit of ADHD-C (for a review, see Harrier & DeOrnellas, 
2005; see also Nigg & Barkley, 2014; Wellington, Semrud-Clikeman, Gregory, Murphy, & 
Lancaster, 2006).  Barkley (1997a) posits that “ADHD-C represents a profound disturbance in 
self-regulation and organization behaviour across time” (p. vii), functions that are subserved by 
prefrontal, mid-brain, and cerebellar regions in the human brain (Fisher et al., 2002).  The 
acknowledgment that dysfunctional neurological processes in the central executive system are 
the biological basis of ADHD brings us back to the earlier discussion on the collaborative 
approach to science in mind, brain, and education and the concept of “brain-based education.”   
ADHD and Implications for Reasoning Performance 
The progressive edge of modern science demonstrates the necessity for a 
multidisciplinary approach to understand the complexity of human brain function, as opposed to 
a fragmented approach (Brown, 2006).  Advances in neuroscience imaging have quite literally 
provided a clearer picture of the complex neurological underpinnings of ADHD.  Traditional 
tests of executive functioning (see Table 1) corroborate the executive processing deficits 
recognized in ADHD.  However, this constructs an overly reductionistic interpretation of 
complex cognitive operations (Brown, 2006) that does little to advance interventions, generate 
innovative teaching methods, and optimize learning environments.  As Brown notes, executive 
function deficits do not segregate their effects to discrete and isolated mechanisms.  Rather, the 
negative consequences of frontal lobe impairments resemble disruptions in a computer operating 
system that interfere with the reliability and smooth running of multiple software programs.  A 
multidisciplinary approach with respect to ADHD could determine how neurological 
impairments of executive brain processes affect the complex interaction of multiple cognitive 
components in applied tasks of thinking, reasoning, and decision-making.  Ultimately, the 
overarching goal is to merge this knowledge with novel approaches to generate innovative 
teaching practices that enhance or compensate the brain’s learning capacity. 
Extensive research has examined ADHD in terms of the brain’s neurological 
reinforcement and extinction mechanisms that alter behaviour (e.g., Johansen, Aase, Meyer, & 
Sagvolden, 2002), probabilistic learning via monetary rewards and punishments, (e.g., Garon, 
Moore, & Waschbusch, 2006; Luman, Oosterlaan, Knol, & Sergeant, 2008; Masunami, Okazaki, 
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& Maekawa, 2009), inhibitory control of executive functions (e.g., Clark et al., 2007; Schachar, 
Mota, Logan, Tannock, & Klim, 2000), and  working memory deficits (for a review, see Au et 
al., 2014; see also Holmes et al., 2010; Martinussen, Hayden, Hogg-Johnson, & Tannock, 2005).  
Questions remain as to how acknowledged central executive deficits in the ADHD brain, 
specifically inhibitory control, might impair the ability to perform decontextualized reasoning 
(reasoning logically from premises irrespective of personal beliefs or context; Moshman & 
Franks, 1986) when reasoning on  logic or probability problems that might parallel those given in 
the classroom.  A 2014 data base search of MEDLINE/PubMed, Education Resources 
Information Centre (ERIC), and PsycINFO using the keyword of ADHD paired with phrases of 
executive function, inhibitory control, executive inhibition, response inhibition, working 
memory, abstract reasoning, logical reasoning, or probability reasoning produced no results of 
applied studies of this nature.  To this author’s knowledge, no study has investigated how 
executive deficits of inhibitory control, as thought to occur with the psychopathology of ADHD, 
might impair the reasoning performance of individuals with ADHD on problem-solving tasks 
that require the inhibition of irrelevant information to produce a “correct” or normative response 
based on logical principles. 
Study Purpose and Overview 
 The purpose of this thesis is to study how individuals diagnosed with ADHD perform in 
abstract reasoning, as compared with a control group of individuals without ADHD.  The 
primary focus is on potential differences between the two groups’ abilities to inhibit or suppress 
one source of information over another when instructed to solve traditional base-rate problems 
either by “statistics” or “beliefs.”  Consider, for example, the following base-rate problem from 
De Neys and Glumicic, 2008 (as adapted from Kahneman & Tversky, 1973): 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 managers and 
4 firemen.  Don is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Don is 27 years old. All 
his friends consider him very brave and strong, and in relatively good physical shape. He 
goes to the gym regularly. What is the probability that Don is a manager? Please answer 
using BELIEFS (or alternatively – Please answer using STATISTICS) 
Conflict (incongruent) problems, as illustrated above, are those in which the presented 
base-rates and description dictate opposing responses; non-conflict (congruent) problems are 
those in which the base-rates and description support the same response.  In the conflict problem 
5 
 
illustrated above, when instructed to respond under the belief instruction, the appropriate 
response would be about 0% probability that Don is a manager.  According to serial models (e.g., 
default interventionist model) of traditional dual process theories, when responding under the 
“statistic” instruction, one must override and inhibit an intuitive answer cued by the compelling 
description to respond with 100% probability that Don is a manager.   
The associations we make over time tend to activate an autonomously derived decision 
based on prior experiences or beliefs unless the initial judgment is suppressed to allow us to 
further reflect and detach from contextual cues (Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010).  This ability to 
inhibit default reactions based on generalizations from prior experience or beliefs is an executive 
function that is highly reliant on inhibitory control (De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005; 
Stanovich & West, 2000).  Traditional base-rate problems such as those illustrated above are 
ideal for studying executive inhibitory processes because the reasoner is forced to inhibit one 
source of information over another to produce an appropriate response according to the response 
instruction.  Given the difficulties in executive functioning associated with ADHD (Barkley, 
1997a, 1997b) it seems reasonable to explore whether well-evidenced deficits in inhibitory 
control for individuals with ADHD hinder their reasoning performance. 
 This thesis examines the relationship between ADHD, reasoning performance, and 
executive inhibitory control.  One way of doing this is by having participants with ADHD and 
their non-ADHD counterparts solve belief/probability tasks that are assumed to require the 
activation of executive inhibitory processes to suppress one of two conflicting responses.  A 
discussion will follow providing insight into the comparative reasoning performance by the two 
groups.  Findings of this research can better inform educators, psychologists, and researchers on 
how to help students with ADHD learn more efficiently and successfully.  Interventions that 
provide strategic training to advance reasoning skills and the provision of extra time to activate 
hypothetical reasoning may supply mental reasoning tools and promote skills to prevent 
cognitive overload.  This may enhance development of neural reasoning networks in students 
with ADHD (Posner & Rothbart, 2005), increase overall academic achievement in the 
classroom, and improve performance on intelligence tests (Naglieri, Salter, & Edwards, 2004).  
Thesis Organization 
Chapter Two begins with a general overview of ADHD outlining the dominant theory 
associated with the disorder, a discussion of the executive functions shown to manifest deficits in 
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ADHD and a literature review that supports conclusions of executive impairments associated 
with the disorder.  The theoretical framework of the dual-process theories of reasoning in 
decision-making (analytic-based reasoning and belief-based reasoning) will follow.  The 
conclusion of Chapter Two highlights the apparent lack of research regarding ADHD and the 
link to possible deficits in applied reasoning for those with the disorder.  Chapter Three will 
provide the reader with a detailed plan of the study’s research methods and results of the 
statistical analyses.  Chapter Four will provide the discussion, implications, practical, limitations, 
future studies, and concluding remarks. 
Borrowing from De Neys (2012), some general clarifications are provided relating to the 
nomenclature applied to this thesis.  For the sake of simplicity, the overarching term of ADHD 
was used when discussing the dominant model of ADHD-C, the focus of this paper, unless 
specifically differentiating between subtypes.  Traditional labeling of responses as “incorrect” or 
“biased” is somewhat of an over simplistic appraisal of responses, as authentic measures of 
normative accuracy are much more complex and subject to inferences derived from Bayes’ 
theorem connecting conditional probabilities to their inverses (Evans, 2010).  This is an exercise 
in probability calculus that is very much beyond the scope of this paper.  For the sake of 
simplicity and consistency, the terms “correct,” “normative,” or “logical” are used as general 
terms to refer to responses based on formal rules by which information should be measured and 
judged (Elqayam & Evans, 2011).  Additionally, the term “logical” is used as a general 
description to refer both to standard logic and probability theory in problem-solving.   
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Definition of Terms 
Attention deficit disorder 
(ADD) 
First designation used in DSM-III (APA, 1980) to highlight 
attentional impairments as the central feature of disorder. 
Attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) 
Name changed in DSM IV (APA, 2000).  A mental illness 
usually beginning in childhood, consisting of symptoms of 
inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity that are 
inappropriate for the child's age (APA, 2013). 
Base-rate The statistical probability of an event occurring without 
further intervention (Reyna, 2004). 
Base-rate neglect The tendency to undervalue statistical information in favour 
of stereotypical descriptions (Bar-Hillel, 1980). 
Behavioural inhibition See inhibitory control. 
Behaviour self-regulation The ability to monitor and control our own behaviour, 
emotions, or thoughts, altering them in accordance with the 
demands of the situation (Barkley, 1997a). 
Belief bias The tendency to judge conclusions according to belief, 
regardless of validity (Thompson, 2013). 
Cognitive bias See belief bias. 
Conflict detection In base-rate problems:  Awareness that a stereotypical 
description cues a response that conflicts with the response 
based on the analytic base-rate information (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008). 
Decontextualized reasoning To reason logically from premises irrespective of their 
content (Moshman & Franks, 1986). 
Disinhibition A lack of restraint manifested in disregard for social 
conventions, impulsivity, and poor risk assessment (Barkley, 
2012) 
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Disinhibition theories A primary executive inhibition deficit in ADHD leads to a 
cascade of downstream problems in behaviour regulation, 
such as arousal regulation, working memory, and the 
dysfunction of other regulatory domains (Barkley, 1997a) 
Dopaminergic hypothesis Executive deficits in ADHD are linked to abnormalities with 
the brain’s production and/or release of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine (Levy, 1991). 
Executive functioning An umbrella term to describe a variety of processes 
commonly assumed to play a role in higher level cognitive 
operations (Barkley, 2012); a particular set of components 
(variously termed “executive processes,” “executive 
routines,” “control processes,” “metacomponents,” or 
“executive functions”) that exert superordinate control over 
the brain’s computational programs (Sternberg, 1985).  
Executive inhibition See inhibitory control. 
Heuristic bias See belief bias. 
Heuristic response/judgment Response guided by a mental shortcut rather than using more 
analytic procedures (Evans, 2006). 
Intuition Immediate apprehension by the mind without the 
intervention of reasoning (Evans, 2010). 
Intuitive judgment Those judgments that are arrived at by an informal and 
unstructured mode of reasoning without the use of analytical 
methods or deliberative calculation. (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). 
Inhibitory control A forerunner of executive functions that sets the stage for 
proficient performance of other executive functions and 
command a range of mechanisms that function to inhibit 
irrelevant cognitive associations, suppress inappropriate or 
prepotent responses, defer responses to a more appropriate 
time, or resist interference from irrelevant stimuli that may 
disrupt the goal at hand (Barkley, 1997a). 
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Logical response  See normative response. 
Metacognition 
 
 
 
The individual's own awareness and consideration of his or 
her cognitive processes and strategies.  The uniquely human 
capacity of people to be self-reflexive, not just to think and 
know but to think about their own thinking and knowing 
(Flavell, 1979).  
Mind, brain, and education  
science (MBE) 
 
Brain-based educational pedagogy that is spurring a radical 
shift in how we think about education and how we teach our 
students (Tokuhama-Espinosa, 2011). 
Mindware The rules, knowledge, procedures, and strategies that a 
person can retrieve from memory to aid in decision-making 
and problem-solving (Perkins, 1995). 
Normative response 
 
Responses based on formal rules by which information 
should be measured and judged (Elqayam & Evans, 2011). 
Rationality Open minded thinking disposition that consistently uses 
reason or logic in thinking out a problem in accordance with 
normative principles (Stanovich, 2009) 
Response Inhibition See inhibitory control. 
Salience effect Argument weight, or statistical probability, is often 
overlooked in favor of salient, compelling descriptions that 
cue flawed judgments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
Selective attention Attention that allows one to focus on a single stimulus and 
block distracters (Wiig, 2011). 
Self-regulation Self-regulation represents both effortful and, in some models, 
involuntary mechanisms that allow behaviour to be adapted 
appropriately to a changing context (Logan, 1994) 
Sustained attention Attention that is maintained over time and is controlled 
(Wiig, 2011) 
Traditional base-rate problem Reasoning problem in which the stereotypical description 
conflicts with presented base-rates and prompts differing 
responses (Evans, 2006). 
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Type 1 Reasoning Processes Cognitive processes correlated with rapid thinking and 
delivering an autonomously produced correlated with prior 
experiences or beliefs (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Type 2 Reasoning Processes Cognitive processes correlated with slower, more deliberate 
thinking that is effortful and highly dependent on working 
memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Working memory  A neural activation resource of limited capacity and duration 
that serves to maintain and manipulate mentally represented 
knowledge for short periods of time (Wiig, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 This chapter includes a critical review of the literature related to ADHD and dual process 
theories of reasoning.  The literature review is divided into four sections.  The first section 
provides an overview of ADHD along with data on prevalence, etiology, differentiation of 
subtypes, biological underpinnings, and comorbidity of ADHD.  The second section overviews 
Barkley’s (1997a, 1997b) theoretical conceptualization of the underlying factors associated with 
ADHD relating to disinhibition.  This is followed by a review of the evidence that supports a 
core deficit of executive response inhibition in ADHD.  The third section discusses dual process 
theories of reasoning with a focus on the serial model of reasoning; specifically, the default 
interventionist account of reasoning.  Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of the 
current study, the two experimental tasks used in the study, and the expected hypotheses. 
Overview of ADHD 
The essential feature of ADHD is currently described as a “persistent pattern of 
inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning or development to a 
degree that is inconsistent with normal development,” (APA, 2013, p. 59).  The diagnostic 
criteria for ADHD in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) contain five parts, A through E (see Table 2).  
Part A contains 18 distinct diagnostic symptoms of both inattention (A1) and hyperactivity-
impulsivity (A2), of which six or more must have persisted for at least six months.  Part B 
requires that symptoms be present before age 12.  Part C requires that impairment must be 
present in two or more settings; D stipulates the requirement for “clear evidence that the 
symptoms interfere with, or reduce the quality of, social, academic, or occupational functioning” 
(APA, 2013, p. 60).  Finally, Part E requires that symptoms do not occur exclusively during the 
course of other mental health conditions.  If both criterion under A1 (inattention) and A2 
(hyperactivity- impulsivity) are present, a diagnosis of ADHD Combined Presentation (ADHD-
C) is indicated.  If only the criterion for inattention (A2) has been met, a diagnosis of ADHD 
Predominantly Inattentive Presentation (ADHD-I) is specified.  If only the criterion for 
hyperactivity- impulsivity (A2) has been met, a diagnosis of ADHD Predominantly Hyperactive/ 
Impulsive Presentation (ADHD-H) is specified.  The latter type, ADHD-H , often arises in the 
preschool years, typically at ages 3 to 4 years (Applegate et al., 1997) and rarely occurs beyond 
 12 
 
six years of age (Nigg, 2005, Willcutt et al., 2012).  Thus, it is unclear whether ADHD 
Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive presentation (ADHD-H) is really distinct from the ADHD 
Combined Presentation (ADHD-C) or simply an earlier developmental stage of it (Nigg & 
Barkley, 2014).  The combined subtype, ADHD-C represents the classic ADHD profile, 
characterized by impulsiveness and high activity levels as well as poor focused attention (mind 
off task, easily distracted, inability to concentrate).  ADHD-C has an onset within the first few 
grades of primary school (ages 5-8; Hart, Lahey, Loeber, Applegate, & Frick, 1995), likely 
owing to the prerequisite that both hyperactivity and inattention be present to diagnose this 
subtype.  The inattentive subtype of ADHD-I appears to emerge a few years later (ages 8-12) 
than the other types (Applegate et al., 1997) and appears to have a different biological 
mechanism of activation, leading some researchers to argue that it may be a different disorder 
altogether (Barkley, 2001, 2006; Carr et al., 2010; Milich et al., 2001). 
Adults identified as ADHD by this interview also have been shown to have significant 
deficits in measures of inattention, inhibition, and working memory and to be impaired in 
numerous domains of major life activities in this and prior projects (Barkley and Murphy, 2006, 
Barkley et al. 2008; Fischer et al. 2004; Murphy et al. 2001). 
 Prevalence. The prevalence of ADHD is at least as high outside of North America as it is 
in North American children, with the highest prevalence rates being seen when using DSM-IV 
diagnoses (Faraone, Sergeant, Gillberg, & Biederman, 2003).  The most accurate estimations 
come from recent large-scale studies.  One meta-analysis of worldwide prevalence studies 
reported an average of 5.5% of children as having ADHD (Polanczyk, Silva de Lima, Horta, 
Biederman, & Rohde, 2007), while an epidemiological study of U.S. adults as well as a 
worldwide prevalence study placed the prevalence at 3.4 to 4.4% (Fayyad et al., 2007; Kessler, 
Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005).  Increasing rates (Visser, Bitsko, Danielson, Perou, & 
Blumberg, 2010) are likely fueled by increasing awareness of symptoms among educators and 
parents, greater transfer of knowledge from the scientific community to medical professionals 
(Goldstein & Naglieri, 2008), as well as the broadening of diagnostic criteria to include more 
subgroups (APA, 2013).  Thus, more individuals are referred, diagnosed, and treated.  
 Etiology.  Considerable research has accumulated on various etiologies for ADHD 
(Barkley, 2006; Nigg, 2006).  Notably, virtually all of this research pertains to the Combined 
Type of ADHD –C as ADHD-I, the subset associated with a sluggish cognitive tempo, is likely 
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qualitatively different disorder.  But for ADHD-C, findings are unequivocal that, while ADHD 
may have multiple etiologies, neurological and genetic factors likely play the greatest role in 
causing this disorder (Barkley, 2006; Nigg, 2006).  Family and adoption studies provide 
unmistakable evidence of the genetic component in ADHD (Biederman et al., 1992; Faraone & 
Biederman, 1998).  With a heritability rate of just under 80% (see Figure 1), ADHD is more 
heritable than asthma, breast cancer, and schizophrenia (Faraone & Biederman, 1998).  It is 
important to note that, although research strongly implicates neurobiological and genetic factors 
in ADHD, environmental and social factors can alter the trajectory of the disorder.  Factors such 
as parental training programs and academic interventions for ADHD students may mitigate 
negative outcomes thought to be attributable to ADHD (Loe & Feldman, 2007; Sonuga-Barke, 
Daley, Thompson, Laver-Bradbury, & Weeks, 2001). 
The common neurological pathway through which these causes produce their effects on 
behaviour has become evident from converging lines of research that use a broad array of 
assessment tools, including neuropsychological tests of frontal lobe functioning, 
electrophysiological measures (electroencephalogram, quantitative electroencephalography, 
event-related potentials), measures of cerebral blood flow, and neuro-imaging studies using 
positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and functional MRI.  
Numerous studies have used neuropsychological tests of frontal lobe functions (see Table 1) to 
uncover executive functioning deficits (for a review, see Barkley, 2006).  Consistent results 
suggest that poor inhibition of behavioural responses, or executive inhibition (Nigg 2001, 2006) 
is impaired in this disorder, at least for ADHD-C.  Possible neurotransmitter dysfunction or 
imbalances have been proposed in ADHD for quite some time (for a review, see Sagvolden, 
Johansen, Aase, & Russell, 2005).  Neurochemical abnormalities that may underlie this disorder 
suggests involvement in at least three systems, these being dopaminergic, noradrenergic, and 
serotonergic, which mediate attention and concentration (dopamine), sleep, aggression, and 
irritability (serotonin), and alertness, adrenaline levels, and fight or flight reactions 
(norepinephrine).  As frontal brain regions are rich in dopamine, dopamine may be an important 
link for understanding ADHD pathophysiology.  There exists substantial support for the 
dopaminergic hypothesis that identifies dysregulation in the dopamine system as an underlying 
origin of ADHD (Genro, Kieling, Rohde, & Hutz, 2010) because of the assumed dopamine 
agonistic action of stimulant drugs (Biederman & Faraone, 2002; Castellanos, 1997; Castellanos 
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et al., 2002; Johansen et al., 2002).  However, as with all psychopathologies, research 
conclusions are largely based on correlational findings, prohibiting claims of direct causality. 
The DSM-5 (APA, 2013) notes that for persons with ADHD, academic or work 
performance is often impaired, even in the absence of a specific learning disorder.  Although the 
DSM -5 makes a reference to involvement of cognitive processes for inattentive behaviour, the 
diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 continue to underscore behavioural, rather than cognitive or 
neuropsychological dysfunctions, allowing for considerable latitude for clinical judgement in the 
diagnosis of ADHD.  Efforts to obtain a cognitive profile of ADHD as a reliable means of 
assessment using traditional psychometric measures of intellectual ability or a variety of 
neuropsychological measures has been elusive thus far (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Goldstein & 
Naglieri, 2008).  The high rate of comorbidity with ADHD (Barkley, 2006) conditions makes 
differential diagnosis and treatment a complex process.  Cognitive mapping of ADHD profiles is 
an important area of research as identifying the cognitive processes associated with ADHD may 
help with diagnosis and also facilitate the design of effective educational interventions. 
 Comorbidity and ADHD.  Executive functioning deficits specific to ADHD are not like 
a fracture where it can be diagnosed like an x-ray (Brown, 2008).  The task of sorting out 
organizational roles of executive functions is often complicated by comorbid learning disorders 
or psychiatric conditions.  Elevated levels of comorbid externalizing behaviours (conduct 
problems, aggression) and internalizing disorders (anxiety, depression) symptoms are associated 
with greater ADHD symptom severity, emphasizing the need for early intervention.  Kessler et 
al. (2005) reports that adults with ADHD are more than six times as likely to have one or more 
comorbid psychiatric conditions at some time in their life, with two of the most frequent being 
oppositional defiant disorder and anxiety disorders (Adler, Barkley, Newcorn, Spencer, & Weiss, 
2007), which reflects the lifelong impact of the condition. 
The overlap of anxiety disorders with ADHD has been found to be 10% to 40% in clinic-
referred children, averaging to about 25% of children to over one third of adolescents and even 
higher in adults (Adler et al., 2007; Barkley, 2006; Biederman, Newcorn, & Sprich, 1991; 
Tannock, 2000), with about 50% of those cases developing before age 6 years (Adler et al., 
2007; Brown, 2000; Jensen  et al., 2001; Mayes et al., 2009; Merikangas, Nakamura, & Kessler, 
2009).  More common to ADHD are learning disabilities.  Children with ADHD have a 
significantly higher rate of learning disabilities than children without ADHD, with rates as high 
 15 
 
as 70% documented in children referred for ADHD (Mayes, Calhoun, & Crowell, 2000).  Of 
this, disabilities in math, reading, and spelling are recorded at about 30% for each of these areas; 
however, the overall prevalence for a learning disability doubled to that of 70% when a learning 
disability of written expression was accounted for (Mayes et al., 2000).  
 Biological Underpinnings of ADHD.  Researchers have been studying cognitive 
impairments associated with ADHD using cognitive tests originally developed by 
neuropsychologists to evaluate frontal lobe functioning from stroke, schizophrenia, or traumatic 
brain injury.  Many executive function tests have been utilized to assess important cognitive 
management functions in the prefrontal cortex where the brain’s executive system is thought to 
be located (for a review see Nigg, Blaskey, Huang-Pollock, & Rappley, 2002; see also Barkley, 
2006).  As increasing numbers of research studies documented that individuals with ADHD 
performed poorer than non-ADHD controls on these measures of executive function, researchers 
began to describe ADHD as a neuropsychological disorder of executive functioning (for a 
review, see Dickstein, Bannon, Castellanos, & Milham, 2006).  Although the definition of 
executive function is still evolving, most researchers agree that the designation refers to neural 
circuits that prioritise, integrate, organize, and regulate other cognitive functions (Brown, 2006).  
Thus, the brain’s executive system is assumed to provide an instrument for self-regulation (Vohs 
& Baumeister, 2004).  Even with executive function tests specifically designed to isolate 
operative areas of inhibitory control or working memory, the brain’s complex and dynamic 
integrated management of neural circuits makes it difficult to pinpoint precise functions of key 
executive components.  Moreover, neural networks are not created equally and they do not 
function in isolation – some neural networks have integrated operations, others manage 
subordinate networks.  For example, various neural networks in the prefrontal cortex, limbic 
region, and cerebellum collectively function to organize and manage executive components 
(Fisher et al., 2002).  It is the dynamic and integrated operation of the brain as a whole that the 
current study is most interested in and reflects the research question for this paper.  How do 
students with ADHD think, reason, and make judgments on complex logic problems that might 
be similar to those given in a classroom setting?  Understanding how individuals with ADHD 
perform cognitively in a classroom setting when problem-solving will assist with creating a 
cognitive profile for ADHD, which can help to inform interventions for improved classroom 
learning. 
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 Differentiating Symptoms of ADHD Subtypes.  ADHD-I is characterized as a failure 
of appropriate cortical arousal and directed or selective attention (Naglieri, 2005).  Children with 
ADHD-I have impairment in selective attention and may appear day dreamy, hypoactive, 
lethargic, and even withdrawn (Barkley, 1997a).  When a multidimensional stimulus array is 
presented to a person who is then required to pay attention to only one dimension, the 
suppression of response to more salient stimuli and the allocation of attention to the central target 
rely on the resources of selective attention and arousal.  Those with ADHD-C have significant 
deficits in behavioural inhibition and inattention (the executive functions) that are critical for 
effective self-regulation (Barkley, 1997a; for a review, see Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  This is best 
exemplified by the account of a child who can focus for length periods on a stimulating computer 
game but has considerable trouble staying on task during a monotonous or uninteresting 
classroom assignment.  The ADHD-C child can attend to the computer game because ADHD-C 
is characterized as lacking in behavioural control not attention, whereas ADHD-I is characterized 
as having a failure of selective attention.  Such a differentiation is important to recognize and 
appreciate, particularly when designing classroom interventions to support ADHD. 
 Children with ADHD-C are considered to have poor behavioural inhibition (Nigg & 
Barkley, 2014).  This can be manifested in, for example, problems with inhibition of dominant, 
but erroneous responses leading to impulsive decision-making, rash judgments, impetuous 
actions or verbal responses, poor planning, foresight, and anticipation, reduced sensitivity to 
errors, poor implementation of structure and organization, impaired verbal problem-solving and 
self-directed speech, poor rule governed behaviour, poor self-regulation of emotion, problems 
developing, using, and implementing organizational strategies, and difficulties with self-
regulation and inhibition (Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  Thus, it is not surprising that increasingly 
ADHD is not seen as a disorder of attention at all, rather as a disorder primarily of self-
regulation.  Indeed, Barkley (1997a, 2001) concludes that ADHD-I could be considered a 
separate disorder from that of ADHD to differentiate the specific cognitive impairments: deficits 
in attentional performance in ADHD-I and impairment of self-regulation in ADHD-C.  In 
attempts to understand the origin of ADHD-C, researchers and clinicians have shifted their 
research from attention to that of disinhibition (Barkley, 1997a; 1997b; Douglas, 1999; 
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996, but for a review see Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  Executive inhibition 
refers to the deliberate suppression of a prepotent, yet task-inappropriate response in order to 
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protect other responses deemed necessary for the service of a distal goal in working memory 
(Nigg, 2003).  This process is deliberate, requires cognitive resources, and occurs with relatively 
low fear or anxiety (i.e., suppression of a response not motivated by fear or anxiety).   
Disinhibition Theories of ADHD 
Disinhibition theories, as applied to ADHD, offer a parsimonious, integrative, and 
testable theory of the core origin of dysfunction in ADHD (Nigg, 2001), and has been the focus 
of much research in recent years.  One basic account of the disinhibition theory, as represented 
by Barkley (1997b, 2010) and Schachar, Tannock, and Logan (1993), suggests a primary 
executive inhibition deficit in ADHD leads to a cascade of downstream problems in behaviour 
regulation, such as arousal regulation, working memory, and the dysfunction of other regulatory 
domains (see illustrative model, Figure 2).  Disinhibition theories almost exclusively refer to the 
combined type of ADHD, which encompasses characteristics of inattention, hyperactivity, and 
impulsivity (Barkley, 1997b, 2010; Pennington, & Ozonoff, 1996; Quay, 1997; Schachar et al., 
1993), while the inattentive subtype, ADHD-I, is mainly associated with selective attention 
problems (Barkley, 2001; Goldstein & Naglieri, 2008).  Several reviews have concluded that 
executive dysfunction, particularly behavioural inhibition as defined through disinhibition 
theories, is a primordial component in ADHD (Barkley, 1997b, Pennington, & Ozonoff, 1996; 
Schachar et al., 1993).   
  Predictably, our increased scope of understanding of ADHD as well as the heterogeneity 
of the population diagnosed with the disorder has generated many theories on the putative causes 
the disorder.  Competing models from theorists who disagree on the primacy of an inhibitory 
deficit emphasize other factors as principal moderators of performance, such as activation, focus, 
effort, emotion, and memory (Brown 2005, 2006), arousal activation and effort (Sergeant, 2000; 
Sergeant, Oosterlaan, & Van der Meere, 1999), alertness /vigilance systems (Swanson et al., 
1998), delay aversion (Sonuga-Barke, 2005), self-regulation (Douglas, 1999), cognitive and 
affective control (Nigg & Casey, 2005), and reinforcement and motivation (Sagvolden et al., 
2005).  Their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, the focus of this study being on the 
more dominant theories of ADHD that specify impairment of executive inhibition as a 
primordially controlling factor of executive function and a core neurocognitive dysfunction 
specific to the combined type of ADHD (Barkley, 1997b; Schachar et al., 1993).   
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 Extant literature converges on the broad domain of executive function as the major area 
of impairment (Barkley, 1997b; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996), centering on the primacy of 
executive inhibition to control a wide range of complex executive functions and behaviours, a 
conclusion that continues to receive empirical support (Bayliss & Roodenrys, 2000).  The basic 
principle of this executive model of behaviour inhibition is that suppression of prepotent 
response is essential for self-regulation (Logan, 1994).  Self-regulation represents both effortful 
and, in some models, involuntary mechanisms that allow behaviour to be adapted appropriately 
to a changing context.  Thus, complex actions and higher level cognition, including social 
behaviour, response inhibition, planning, skilled motor behaviour, appropriate delay, and 
language production, all hinge on effective executive (inhibitory) control (Nigg, 2001) and are 
necessary for higher-order behaviours such as working memory (for avoiding extraneous 
information), goal-directed behaviour (important for delayed gratification), and emotional self-
control (for minimizing emotionally laden reactions; Barkley, 1997b, Quay, 1997).  This study 
focuses on this primary deficit of inhibition associated with ADHD; in particular, response 
inhibition and the ability to suppress a prepotent response when solving problems in which 
inhibition of beliefs mediates normative performance. 
Nigg (in press, as cited in Eme 2015) discusses inhibition failures from a theoretical 
model that aligns well with claims from theorists of dual processes of reasoning.  Specifically, 
Nigg describes two types of inhibitory failures that stem from either bottom-up or top-down 
regulatory processes and their respective neural connections.  Type 1 (bottom-up) processes are 
functionally connected to subcortical brain areas (basal ganglia, limbic system, thalamus, 
hypothalamus, and cerebellum) and are thought to be automatic, reactive, and reward motivated 
(Nigg, in press, as cited in Eme 2015).  Flawed decision-making associated with these Type 1 
reward-based processes is assumed to stem from temporal discounting (also known as delay 
discounting) of rewards motivated (Nigg, in press, as cited in Eme 2015).  In this scenario, poor 
immediate rewards are impulsively chosen over superior, but delayed, rewards due to the 
dominance of reward-driven Type 1 regulatory processes. 
 The second model of inhibitory failure is driven by Type II (top-down) processes, served 
primarily by the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulated cortex and their connections to 
other cortical and subcortical areas (Nigg, in press, as cited in Eme, 2015).  As with Type 2 
processes of reasoning, these Type II executive control processes are correlated with more 
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effortful, deliberate, goal motivated behaviours.  Faulty decision-making associated with Type II 
regulatory processes is thought to stem from a failure of Type II executive processes to over-ride 
stimulus-triggered responses (Nigg, in press, as cited in Eme 2015) so as to allow regulation of 
focus and behaviour. 
Regardless of the origin of inhibitory deficits, when inhibitory control is deficient, the 
ensuing behaviour encompasses a wide range of inappropriate impulses and motor actions.  This 
executive model of behaviour inhibition can account for both impulsive–hyperactive and 
inattentive behaviours in the ADHD combined type (Barkley, 1997b).  The explanatory appeal of 
an executive behaviour inhibition deficit relating to the most obvious ADHD symptoms is 
compelling.  Without a proper functioning mechanism to delay or prohibit a prepotent response, 
the possibility of thoughtful, appropriate goal-directed behaviour in a situation is greatly 
diminished, if not impossible.  Executive functions of inhibition underpin reasoning abilities, 
problem-solving, and planning abilities that are crucial to the successful accomplishment of 
future goals (Barkley, 2015; Diamond, 2013) and are of critical importance for successful 
functioning in social and academic, and occupational domains (Diamond, 2013). 
 Evidence for Disinhibition Theories.  There is little doubt that poor behavioural 
inhibition plays a central role in ADHD (for reviews, see Barkley, 1997a; Nigg, 2001).  Research 
into executive functioning using classic executive function tasks (see Table 1 for descriptions) 
may be the most well-developed area of research in ADHD and more contemporary fMRI 
studies have literally provided us with an improved picture of the neurobiological deficits related 
to the ADHD brain (Cortese et al., 2012; Hart, Radua, Nakao, Mataix-Cols, & Rubia, 2013). 
Further research has supported the conclusion that response suppression is the primary 
origin of executive function deficits in ADHD.  Data from studies of executive function tasks 
(for a review, see Nigg, 2005) provide convergent evidence of a deficit in response inhibition (in 
contrast to sensory, input, or cognitive inhibition) and link ADHD to difficulties with response 
output suppression during the late stage of processing (Nigg, 2001).  Strong support for an 
executive inhibitory deficit comes from experimental studies using the non-motivational go/no-
go task (Table 1).  This task creates a dominant response set by making most trials “go trials.”  
The dominant response must be subsequently withheld on the comparatively rare “no-go trials.”  
The ability to interrupt an about-to-be-executed response requires activation of the right inferior 
frontal cortex (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003), as well as regions in basal 
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ganglia, including the caudate nucleus (Casey, Tottenham, & Fossella, 2002).  Extensive 
neuroimaging data support the preferential involvement of inferior regions of dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex on the no-go versus the go trials, using both block designs (participants 
alternate between “go” responses on every trial and a proportion of “no go” trials; Casey et al., 
1997; Vaidya et al., 1998) and trial-by-trial event-related fMRI methods (varying trial formats 
are pseudo-randomly interspersed; Konishi et al., 1999).  Recordings by electroencephalogram 
and magnetoencephalogram also indicate frontal activation on the no-go versus the go trials (e.g., 
Yong-Liang et al., 2000).  More specifically, in fMRI studies with children and adults without 
ADHD, Casey and colleagues (1997) found more activation in the anterior cingulate cortex for 
those that had the most difficulty with the no-go trials, suggesting that difficulty of the response 
conflict causes activation in the anterior cingulate cortex to monitor the conflict.  This aligns 
with similar neuroimaging findings of conflict detection studies relating to the loci involved in 
reasoning and decision-making (see De Neys, 2012 for a review).  Casey et al. (1997) also 
observed greater activation in the orbito-prefrontal cortex (but not in the anterior cingulate) for 
those making the fewest false alarm errors, suggesting that this brain area is involved in 
inhibiting the inappropriate response. 
Altogether, these neuroimaging data provide converging evidence that a separate 
inhibitory process is required for behavioural suppression in the no-go trials and that the ability 
to inhibit on no-go trials depends on specific regional activation in the prefrontal cortex (Nigg, 
2001).  Notwithstanding the evidence, the go/no-go task has been criticized for not functionally 
isolating inhibition.  Specifically, critics argue (e.g., Schachar et al., 1993) it is possible that 
failure to withhold a response on the no-go trial could be accounted for by strong prepotent go 
processes (i.e., strong environmental stimuli), not disinhibition.  This argument has also been 
presented by Nigg (in press, as cited in Eme 2015) – is inhibitory dysfunction due to a failure of 
Type II regulatory executive processes to successfully inhibit Type I reward-based processes, or 
alternatively, are poor immediate rewards impulsively chosen over superior but delayed rewards 
due to the dominance of reward-driven Type 1 regulatory processes? 
 The best evidence for a deficit in response inhibition comes from studies of the stop task, 
(Logan & Cowan, 1984), which has amassed extensive empirical and theoretical support as a 
measure of deliberate suppression of a motor response.  At least 15 studies have now been 
reported for using the stop task as a valid measure of executive inhibitory control in ADHD, or 
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lack thereof (see Nigg, 2001), even when controlled for comorbid oppositional and conduct 
disorders (Dimoska, Johnstone, Barry, & Clarke, 2003; Nigg, 1999; Rubia, Oosterlaan, Sergeant, 
Brandeis, & Leeuwen, 1998; Schachar, Nita, Logan, Tannock, & Klim, 2000).  Moreover, in 
addition to a large deficit in response inhibition, stop task studies have noted smaller deficits in 
slow and variable response output (Nigg, 1999; Oosterlaan, Logan, Sergeant, 1998).  This is 
noteworthy, because it emphasizes the point that it is unlikely excessively strong stimuli that are 
contributing to inhibition difficulties (otherwise the response would be rapid).  This further 
complicates the notion of inhibitory dysfunction as a primary deficit, as slow response speed 
could be due to poor vigilance or activation.  Accordingly, the data may suggest an additional or 
secondary deficit, perhaps in vigilance or sustained attention (Parasuraman, Warm, & See, 
1998), arousal (Losier, McGrath, & Klein, 1996), or activation (Tucker & Williamson, 1984), 
complicating the interpretation of where the dysfunction originates from in the executive system. 
Dual Process Theories of Reasoning 
 Human thinking can be characterized by two qualitatively different streams of processing 
that operate within a dual-process system of reasoning (Evans, 2003, 2008, 2009; Evans & Over, 
1996, 2004; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999, 2004; 
Stanovich & West, 2000).  Dual process theories of reasoning are numerous – Stanovich (2004) 
identifies over 20 distinct theories – and all have subtle differences to explain the operational 
format and interplay between the two systems; however, they are similar in that they all describe 
the two types of processing as either autonomous or non-autonomous.  Type 1 processes are low 
in computational power but have the advantage that they are low in cost.  The defining feature of 
Type 1 processes is their autonomy (Thompson, 2013), considered autonomous because (a) they 
discharge rapidly, (b) their discharge is obligatory when cued by appropriate stimuli, (c) they do 
not use valuable cognitive resources (e.g., working memory), (d) they do not require conscious 
awareness attention or effort to execute, (e) they do not depend on resources from central 
executive control systems, and (f) multiple Type 1 processes operate in parallel without 
interfering with each other (Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010).  Type 1 processes are correlated with 
heuristic judgments (i.e. mental shortcuts) derived from self-contained experiences and beliefs 
that are delivered “prêt-à-porter” (ready-made) to our stream of conscious awareness (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013).  Alternatively, the non-autonomous Type 2 processes are deliberate and 
require effortful activation to facilitate decontextualized, hypothetical reasoning based on logic 
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and rationality (Evans, 2003).  According to the default interventionist account of dual process 
theories, Type 1 processes form a default response unless there is active and deliberate 
intervention from methodical, explicit Type 2 processes to inhibit and override the Type 1 
outputs (Thompson, 2013).  As analytic reasoning must be deliberately engaged to override the 
quicker belief-based appraisals, it is assumed that slower, more methodical evaluations do not 
interfere with the swift heuristic responses based on prior experience (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
However, the autonomous and faster belief-based reasoning processes are readily able to 
interfere with slower, more rational mental operations (Thompson, 2013).  Thus, only one-way 
interference, not two-way, should occur, which may result in conflicting outputs that compete to 
provide a final judgment. 
Reflective thought derived from Type 2 processes is mentally taxing and limited to single  
tasks at a time (serial processing), making it an undesirable choice for everyday reasoning 
(Evans, 2010).  Humans are cognitive misers and tend towards the most efficient cognitive 
strategies permissible, sometimes at the expense of accuracy (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2009).  
Thus, intuitive Type 1 processes dominate as a labour-saving means for routine decisions and 
judgments.  There are many cases in which these mental shortcuts provide us with the necessary 
ability to make judgments quickly and efficiently (Gigerenzer, 2007), and, without a doubt, these 
quick-thinking skills are needed for survival.  However, an over-reliance on implicit Type 1 
processes can be a “false friend” (Evans, 2010, p. 315).  Although intuitive processing is a quick 
and effective means of reasoning, it more often than not reflects biased or irrational judgments 
(Evans, 2010, Stanovich, 2003), especially in unfamiliar territory or when dealing with novel 
problems or situations.  
A wealth of research has demonstrated that participants tend to strongly favor the 
stereotypical information over the base-rate probability because (a) the stereotype is the more 
intuitive source of information (see Barbey & Sloman, 2007 for a review) and (b) base-rate 
evaluation is assumed to require more effortful Type 2 processing (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Sloman, 1996).  Dual process theorists (Evans, 2003; Sloman, 
1996; Stanovich, 1999; Thompson, 2013) use the temporal asymmetry between the two systems 
to explain the phenomenon of base-rate neglect, the tendency to undervalue statistical 
information in favour of stereotypical descriptions (Bar-Hillel, 1980).  The problem is the 
salience effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  Argument weight, or statistical probability, is 
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often overlooked in favor of salient, compelling descriptions that cue flawed judgments, resulting 
in a belief bias (the tendency to judge conclusions according to belief, regardless of validity; 
Thompson, 2013).  When solving conflict problems that intuitively cue a flawed belief response 
that directly conflicts with logic, the erroneous judgment must be overruled and inhibited by 
more deliberate processes (De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2010; Thompson, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013).  This can be difficult, as our intuitive judgments are often convincing and align with past 
experience, beliefs, or knowledge (Thompson, 2009).  Specific instructions emphasizing the 
necessity for logical responses reduce the belief bias effect, but do not eliminate it (Evans, 2003).  
For example, a strong but undesirable, intuitive response can sometimes dominate over a less 
obvious, but normative, logical response.  Examples can often be found in conflict syllogisms, in 
which a conclusion is logically valid but the premise is unbelievable (e.g., All mammals walk; 
whales are mammals; therefore whales can walk; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
The ability to separate logic from belief is described as decontextualized reasoning 
(Stanovich, 1999, 2003).  Decontextualization skills are considered essential to higher-order 
cognitive abilities of reasoning and judgment (Evans, 2003; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, 
& Evans, 2004).  An increasing research emphasis is targeted at the inhibitory role of the brain’s 
executive system to suppress the default Type 1 responses and adopt a higher level of thinking.  
Certainly we know that a compromise in our ability to engage executive processes of inhibitory 
control will impair our capacity for rational, systematic reasoning (De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2003; 
Handley et al., 2004).  Even in healthy older adults, a reduction in executive inhibitory control 
has been shown to diminish performance in logical reasoning (Christ, White, Mandernach, & 
Keys, 2001).  De Neys, Vartanian, and Goel’s (2008) neuroimaging study of conflict detection, 
which monitored brain regions thought to be associated with conflict detection (anterior 
cingulate) and response inhibition (right lateral prefrontal cortex), concluded that heuristic bias 
can be attributed to a failure of the executive inhibitory control mechanism.  When this premise 
is considered vis-à-vis ADHD and the inhibitory deficits associated with this disorder, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that deficits of inhibitory control strongly evidenced in ADHD may result 
in diminished performance analytic reasoning for individuals diagnosed with this disorder. 
Conflict Detection in Reasoning 
On the assumption that rule-based (Type 2) processes operate more slowly than belief-
based (Type 1) processes, the former should not interfere with the latter; accordingly, reasoners 
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should not be sensitive to conflict.  That reasoners are aware of conflict is a paradox that 
proponents of serial models (e.g., default interventionist model) cannot explain.  The question of 
conflict detection in reasoning has been investigated in multiple studies using a broad range of 
indirect measures to challenge this assumption.  In fact, both biased and non-biased reasoners 
demonstrate a sensitivity to conflict (for a review, see De Neys, 2012).  Even studies 
differentiating between those participants with high cognitive capacity and those with an average 
cognitive capacity have concluded that both groups are implicitly aware of conflict in reasoning 
problems (Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson, Pennycook, Trippas, & Evans, in press).  
Indirect evidence of conflict detection has been shown by: increased response latencies for 
conflict problems relative to non-conflict problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012); increased activation of brain regions thought to regulate conflict 
detection while responding to problems with mismatched information (De Neys et al., 2008; 
Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003); increased attention to critical facts in 
conflict problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008); poorer memory retrieval for target words 
associated with the heuristic response on conflict problems, suggesting that participants had 
attempted to block this information during reasoning (De Neys & Franssens, 2009); increased 
autonomic activation for conflict problems as demonstrated by skin conductance monitoring 
while solving conflict and no-conflict syllogisms (De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010); 
and in conflict base-rate problems, an increased tendency to re-review the paragraph with the 
base-rate information after participants have read the personality description (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008).  This increased base-rate inspection was coupled with a better recall of base-
rate information for conflict problems.  Lastly, reasoning studies that incorporate a measure of 
confidence consistently demonstrate decreased self-reported feelings of confidence for conflict 
problems relative to non-conflict problems (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014; Thompson Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). 
The overall findings from studies suggest that reasoners area at least implicitly aware that 
their intuitively cued response violates normative considerations, but are often unable to 
successfully inhibit the dominant Type 1 response (De Neys, 2012).  Thus, heuristic bias 
suggests a lack of inhibitory control in overriding the salient and tempting description rather than 
a lack of understanding of normative principles (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008, De Neys & 
Franssens, 2009).  The large body of indirect evidence for implicit awareness of conflict has 
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implications for dual-process theories.  Specifically, in the serial model of dual processes 
theories of reasoning, how does an individual become aware of a conflict if Type 2 processes are 
not yet engaged?  As Thompson (2009) argues, current accounts of dual-process theories of 
reasoning cannot account for when and to what extent analytic Type 2 processes intervene and 
supplant the intuitive Type 1 processes in cases of conflict. 
Revisions to Dual Process Theoretical Models  
Revised models have been proposed that attempt to address conflict detection issues for 
sequential (serial) models of dual process theories of reasoning, such as the default-
interventionist model.  For example, De Neys (2012) proposes a model that explains conflict 
detection without compromising reasoning efficiency.  De Neys postulates additional Type 1 
processes of “logical intuition” (De Neys, 2012, p.28) that arise automatically when faced with 
relatively simple logical or probabilistic principles.  According to this account, two key 
characteristics are necessary for logical intuitions to be spontaneously processed: (a) an implicit 
awareness of such logic or probability learned early in life, and (b) an automatic output of this 
knowledge from Type 1 processes.  De Neys’ model allows for an initial shallow awareness of 
logic or probability that can be pitted against another intuitive response (e.g., beliefs) for 
appraisal and detection of conflict.  In the event of conflict, Type 2 processes would be engaged 
to resolve the conflict and inhibit and override the unfavorable response. 
 A further claim could be made that base-rates, even extreme ones (e.g., 995 vs. 5), are not 
so complex so as to require the engagement of analytic Type 2 processes to analyze them (De 
Neys, 2007; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014).  
As per the previously presented example, one only need recognize that group membership for 
one category (e.g., 997 managers) is greater than the other (e.g., 3 firemen), a relatively simple 
concept.  Given this scenario, it is possible that two intuitive outputs are equally accessible for 
intuitive processing and comparison– one of beliefs and one of simple probability.  When 
conflict is detected between the two intuitive response options, Type 2 processes are theoretically 
employed to engage in deeper thinking to resolve the conflict. 
Unlike traditional default interventionist theories, both De Neys’ (2012) hypothesis of 
Type 1 outputs of intuitive logic and De Neys’ (2007) suggestion – echoed by Pennycook et al. 
(2014) and Thompson and Johnson (2014) – that rapid analysis of base-rates may not actually 
require Type 2 processing, can account for conflict detection.  In both of these scenarios, 
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autonomously produced Type 1 processes stream two outputs that can be compared and 
contrasted.  Based on Pennycook and Thompson (2012), decisions can go either way (belief or 
statistic response), depending on one’s worldview, knowledge, or collective experiences.  More 
often, Pennycook and Thompson found, the stereotype belief is chosen, likely due to the human 
tendency to rely on previous context and learning.  Thus, what is called “belief bias” is thought 
to be a decision based on experiential knowledge and the refusal to engage in Bayesian thinking 
– that is, an unwillingness to weigh new evidence (base-rates) against old evidence (experiential 
beliefs) and make a more informed and conversant decision. 
The revised models introduced by De Neys (2007, 2012) and Pennycook et al. (2014) 
provided a rationale for the instruction manipulation in this current study.  If, according to either 
supposition, two Type 1 outputs are spontaneously offered (that of intuitive belief and intuitive 
logic), an instruction manipulation specifying responses be made either by “beliefs” or by 
“statistics” will obviate confusion as to a normative answer.  
THE CURRENT STUDY 
The Utility of Base-rate Problems 
 Executive functioning tests are often considered too one-dimensional or simplistic to 
accurately measure the complex integrated operations of frontal lobe components (Brown, 2008; 
Rabbitt, 1997).  Such tests violate the central assumption of the nature of executive functioning 
regarded as “the simultaneous management of a variety of different functional processes” 
(Rabbitt, 1997, p. 14).  Attempts to isolate and measure specific cognitive functions, such as, for 
example, inhibitory control, are entirely inadequate and akin to “slicing smoke” (Horn, 1991, p. 
198), or as Burgess (1997) illustrates, dissecting a fly and studying its parts to understand how it 
flies.  Cognitive abilities are interrelated and various combinations of processes and abilities are 
employed to complete tasks.  The complex, self-managed tasks of goal directed behaviour 
provides a much more revealing account of executive functioning than compartmentalized 
neuropsychological tests (Brown, 2006).  Base-rate problems provide an ideal comprehensive 
test of executive functioning as one must prioritize, integrate, organize, and inhibit information 
to produce a “correct” answer as per the response instruction. 
 Traditional base-rate problems are skillfully designed to elicit two differing responses: a 
heuristically triggered response cued by a salient stereotypical description and a response based 
on probabilistic logic derived from presented base-rates (the frequency or likelihood of an event 
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occurring without intervention; Reyna, 2004).  Base-rate problems offer a “sweet spot” in 
probability reasoning.2  The problems are not so difficult that they produce floor effects in 
solvability, but yet they are not so simple as to produce ceiling effects of skill.  Of primary 
interest to the current study is the potential for base-rates to measure successful response 
inhibition of a Type 1 output to engage in Type 2 reasoning, as established by prior research 
(Barbey & Sloman, 2007, Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Sloman, 1996).  As applied traditional 
serial model accounts of dual process theories, when solving conflict base-rate problems, an 
unfavourable response must be inhibited and overridden to engage in further processing and 
produce the desired response.  Although base-rate numbers certainly play a prominent role in 
formulating a response, the only math knowledge that is required is the ability to understand that 
one number is larger than another (e.g., 997 is larger than 3).  Thus, these problems are ideal for 
this study’s objective to examine the relationship between ADHD, inhibitory control, and 
successful reasoning.   
Another factor that promotes the utility of base-rate problems is their structural similarity 
to math word problems that are routinely given to students in the classroom:  Math word 
problems have a three-part structure as outlined by Barwell (2005):  scenario, information and a 
question; (b) the information is arbitrary in relation to the scenario; and (c) they involve 
ambiguous use of verb tense, time and reference.  In a similar form, base-rate problems also 
contain the attributes of scenario, (e.g., In a study 1000 people were tested, Don is randomly 
chosen), information (e.g., There were 996 managers and 4 pilots; Don is 36 years old, very 
intelligent, has nerves of steel and great eye hand coordination), and a question (e.g., what is the 
probability that Don is a manger?).  Also similar to math word problems, base-rate problem 
information is arbitrary in relation to the scenario and involves ambiguous use of verb tense, time 
and reference.  Just as teachers would holistically evaluate the decision-making process of 
students completing math word problem, base-rate problems attempt to understand and evaluate 
the reasoning process – that is, the integrated sum of cognitive functioning, not just one specific 
component of it – collectively put into action to make the decision.   
 Base-rate problems also parallel classroom-based math word problems in that both 
require an open approach in which students draw on several sources of information to provide a 
                                                 
2 V. Thompson, personal communication, March 25, 2014 
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normative answer.  This approach can be characterized by four main steps, as outlined by 
Barwell (2005): (a) understanding the problem situation; (b) mathematizing the situation; (c) 
conducting a mathematical analysis; and (d) interpreting and communicating results.  Base-rate 
problems offer an added value in that they offer reasoners two pieces of information that can be 
manipulated to elicit opposing responses:  base-rates and a luring stereotypical description.  
Coupled with an instructional manipulation that asks reasoners to respond either with beliefs (as 
cued by the stereotypical description) or to respond statistically by way of presented base-rates, 
these problems give researchers an ideal opportunity to study the action and interaction of the 
two processes thought to mediate human reasoning, Type 1 intuitive processes and Type 2 
analytical processes.   
ADHD and Inhibitory Control in Analytic Reasoning 
The proposal that inhibition is an essential executive operation for higher-order cognition 
has direct implications for individuals with ADHD and their ability to successfully engage in 
analytic reasoning.  The association between reasoning and ADHD, particularly when reasoning 
on complex problems that might parallel those given in a classroom setting (as opposed to using 
tests of executive functioning to isolate cognitive operations) is an area of research that is ripe for 
exploration (Handley et al., 2004) and that, up till now, has had limited investigation, if any.  It is 
possible that primary deficits of inhibitory control in ADHD, as outlined by disinhibition 
theories, would substantially impair the ability to engage in deeper analytic reasoning when 
solving base-rate conflict problems, in which inhibition of beliefs mediates normative 
performance.  Traditional base-rate problems that offer two conflicting pieces of information are 
ideal for studying executive inhibitory processes because the reasoner is forced to inhibit one 
source of information over another to produce a normative response.  To illustrate the base-rate 
problem task once again, reasoners must make a judgment on the likelihood of group 
membership for an individual (e.g., what is the likelihood that Paul is a doctor?) when offered 
two pieces of conflicting information:  salient base-rates (3 doctors vs. 997 nurses) and a luring, 
but opposing, stereotypical description (Paul lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb, is well 
spoken, interested in politics, and invests a lot of time in his career).  Grounded in disinhibition 
theories associated with ADHD, and taking into account human reasoning practices as outlined 
by dual process theories, if reasoners are forced to suppress one piece of information when 
responding either with beliefs or statistics, significant deficits in reasoning performance should 
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be observed with ADHD participants relative to their non-ADHD counterparts when resolving 
conflict problems using statistics.   
The current experiment provided a direct test of this hypothesis.  Participants both with 
and without ADHD solved base-rate problems using Pennycook et al. (2014) instructional 
manipulation to respond either according to “statistics” (prior probabilities or base-rates) or 
according to “beliefs” (knowledge of real-world stereotypes).  The instruction manipulation 
differentiates between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking when applied to traditional dual process 
models and offers an additional advantage of rendering responses to be unambiguously either 
“correct” or “incorrect” when applied to revised models of dual processes theories of reasoning 
that suggest multiple streams of Type 1 processes delivering outputs based on either base-rates or 
beliefs. 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
 The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a three-item problem-solving 
task thought to measure individual differences in intuitive- analytic thinking styles (Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Koehler, Fugelsang, 2015), incorporated into the study as a secondary task to measure 
the degree of “miserly thinking” by reasoners (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014, p. 147); that is, 
the unwillingness to expend valuable cognitive resources to engage in deeper analytic reasoning.  
To answer the CRT correctly, one is assumed to need to inhibit and override an initial and 
erroneous "gut" response in favour of more analytic one and to engage in further reflection to 
find a mathematically correct answer (Toplak, West, Stanovich, 2011).  This task is evidenced to 
be a potent predictor of rational thinking performance independent of not only intelligence but 
also executive functioning and thinking dispositions (Toplak et al., 2014).  Take, for example, 
one of the three CRT questions from Frederic (2005):  A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The 
bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?  The incorrect answer of 0.10 
cents is initially primed.  Cognitive misers tend to give the first presented response without 
further attention to the validity of their answer whereas more analytic thinkers tend to think past 
the intuitive answer to derive a more suitable response (Toplak et al., 2014).  In the case of 
miserly cognitive processing, the individual holds false confidence for the erroneous response 
and halts further deliberation.  If the ball cost 0.10 cents, the bat would then be 1.10, for a total of 
1.20.  Inhibiting the first intuitive response and engaging in further reflection might lead to 
producing the correct mathematical answer of .05 cents.  One can see from the bat/ball example 
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that successful inhibition is essential to suppress the intuitively primed response and reflect 
further on the problem.  Given the inhibitory deficits strongly associated with ADHD, the CRT 
makes an ideal tool for comparing abilities of activating a prefrontal inhibitory mechanism to 
halt the progress of a prepotent response and allow for further reflection on the problem. 
Hypotheses for Study Task 1 – Base-Rate Problems 
According to the serial default interventionist account of dual process theories (Evans, 
2003), reasoners in both groups should have relatively more difficulty resolving conflict in 
favour of probabilities than beliefs; however, of interest is the ADHD group, who were expected 
to have significantly more difficulties relative to their non-ADHD peers in inhibiting a prepotent 
belief response, as predicted by the disinhibition theories of ADHD (Barkley, 1997b).   
1. In the case of the traditional default interventionist (serial) account of dual process 
theories, in which Type 1 processes form a default response unless there is active and 
deliberate intervention from Type 2 processes to inhibit and override the Type 1 outputs, 
the following hypotheses were made: 
a) Individuals with ADHD should have more difficulty inhibiting the autonomously 
produced belief judgments cued by the stereotypical description when asked to solve 
conflict problems with statistics.  Consequently, belief should cause interference 
when individuals are asked to provide an answer based on statistics.  Difficulty in 
inhibiting the beliefs would be measured by lower accuracy scores on conflict 
problems when instructed to answer using statistics.   
b) Consistent with the currents study’s three factor design – Group (ADHD or non-
ADHD) x Problem Congruency (conflict or non-conflict) x Problem Instruction 
(Statistics or Beliefs) – a three-way interaction was predicted, such that ADHD 
reasoners would have more difficulty than their non-ADHD counterparts resolving 
conflict problems by way of statistics.   
2. In the case of more contemporary models of dual process theories, wherein additional 
Type 1 processes of  “logical intuition” are thought to be available for intuitive 
processing of base-rates or, alternatively, that Type 2 reasoning may not actually be 
required for base-rate processing, the following hypotheses were made: 
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a. When solving conflict problems, Type 1 processes will autonomously stream two 
readily available, yet conflicting responses, (i.e., an intuitive response cued by the 
stereotypical description and a second Type 1 response intuitively derived from the 
base-rate information).  Individuals should be able to reflect on the two 
simultaneously streamed Type 1 response options, detect the conflict, and engage 
Type 2 processes to resolve the conflict between the two Type 1 outputs.  However, 
due to assumed difficulties with inhibitory control, the ADHD group will have more 
difficulty suppressing the inappropriate response, regardless of which response is to 
be overruled (one based on belief or one based on statistics).  Difficulty in inhibiting 
the undesirable response option would be measured by lower accuracy scores on all 
conflict problems, regardless of the response instruction. 
b. In this scenario, a 2-way Group x Congruency interaction would be revealed, such 
that the ADHD group would have more difficulty overall when solving conflict 
problems relative to non-conflict problems, whereas the control group would 
demonstrate similar accuracies across levels of congruency.  No differentiation would 
be shown for the different response instructions of “statistics” or “beliefs,” as both are 
assumed to stream from parallel Type 1 processes and both require similar inhibitory 
capacities, regardless of which response is chosen. 
Hypotheses for Study Task 2 – Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
1. With respect to the CRT task, it was hypothesized that significant differences would be 
observed for CRT responses, such that the ADHD group would have more difficulty 
inhibiting their first intuitive response for purposes of further reflection.  Thus, mean 
accuracies on CRT questions should be considerably lower for the ADHD group relative 
to the control group. 
 
This concludes the literature review on both ADHD and dual process reasoning, as well 
an overview of the current study’s tasks and hypotheses forecasted for the current study.  Chapter 
Three will provide a detailed outline of the study’s research methods and the results of the study.  
Chapter Four will provide a discussion of the findings and what this means in terms of practical 
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implications for educating students with ADHD, as well as limitations, future directions, and 
concluding remarks. 
  
 33 
 
CHAPTER 3  
METHODS of RESEARCH 
This chapter details the research methods of the current study as well as the results of the 
statistical analyses  
Recruitment and Ethics 
Participants. Power calculations (Campbell & Thompson, 2012) determined that a 
sample size of 128 would have 0.8 power to detect a medium (.06) effect.  Both male and female 
adult students of the university were eligible to participate.  A general call for participants, both 
with and without ADHD, was posted on the university’s research bulletin website and various 
hallways throughout the university (see Appendices A and B).  An explicit request for 
participants diagnosed with ADHD was emailed directly to students registered with the 
University’s Disability Services for Students (DSS).  Recruitment and testing for the study 
occurred over the summer and throughout the fall, with both ADHD participants and non-ADHD 
participants tested concurrently.   
In total, 128 individuals from the general university population (66% females) were 
recruited to participate in the study, each receiving CAN$10 for their participation.  Six 
participants identified themselves as “other” (Control = 2; ADHD = 4), indicating their 
membership as university alumni (refer to Table 4 for breakdown of College enrollment).  As 
alumni, these individuals had access to university research bulletins soliciting participants.  Of 
the total participants, 64 participants self-reported a formal diagnosis of ADHD and 64 
participants self-reported no diagnosis of ADHD (See Tables 3 and 4 for a complete breakdown 
of demographical information).  Ten participants were replaced for answering “yes” to having a 
learning disability (1 Non-ADHD, 9 ADHD).  Three participants were replaced for failing to 
follow instructions.  No participants requested that they be withdrawn from the study. 
Participants on medication for ADHD were required to have minimum of 12 hours 
between the time of the study task and their last dose of ADHD medication.  This was 
accommodated with flexible testing times to minimize disruption to individual medication 
protocols.  Participants not on medication for ADHD symptoms were tested at a time mutually 
agreed upon by the researcher and participant.  The majority of participants compiling the 
ADHD group were recruited through DSS.  When contacting the researcher to ask to be a part of 
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the study, if participants did not volunteer their diagnosis of ADHD, they were asked to confirm: 
(a) if they had been diagnosed with ADHD; (b) approximately at what age they were diagnosed; 
(c) by whom (psychiatrist, doctor, or psychologist); and (c) if they are on medication to control 
symptoms of ADHD.  Most participants were either unaware of their particular subtype of 
ADHD or were oblivious to the fact that there were different subtypes.  Complicating the 
situation was the change in nomenclature in 2000 from ADD to ADHD.  Consequently, any 
participants who had been diagnosed before the year 2000 were diagnosed as having ADD, 
which did not include a classification according to subtype.  Ultimately, it was not possible to 
accurately classify participants into subtypes of ADHD.  
Ethics. Ethics approval from the University of Saskatchewan’s Behavioural Ethics 
Research Board was obtained before commencing testing (BEH 15-147).  All participants had 
the opportunity to provide informed consent before participating in the study (see Appendix C).  
Following the task, participants were supplied with a debriefing information sheet and given an 
opportunity to ask questions (see Appendix D). 
Materials and Procedures 
Two study tasks were designed for the experiment.  As a measure of reasoning 
performance, the first task required participants to solve 24 base-rate problems in free time by 
way of either “beliefs” or “statistics.”   A second problem task asked participants to solve three 
simple logic questions from the CRT (Frederic, 2005).  Results of the CRT were matched against 
both the group variable and the reasoning performance.  A further discussion of the CRT and 
anticipated correlations will follow later in this section.  Altogether, the study task took the 
expected 30 minutes or less.   
Permission was granted from Gordon Pennycook to use the base-rate neglect problems 
from Pennycook et al.’s (2014) study, as adapted from De Neys and Glumicic’s (2008) study.  
Instructions for the base-rate problems were adapted from Pennycook et al. (2014).  Participants 
carried out the computerized tasks either individually or in groups of up to three people using 
individual Microsoft computers in the Social Sciences Research Laboratory at the university.  As 
part of the study, participants were prompted to provide demographical information of age, sex, 
year of study, college of study, and total years to date of university education.  Following Study 
Task #1, participants were also prompted to answer the following questions:   
1.  Have you been diagnosed with ADHD? (yes or no)  
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If the answer was “no,” participants were automatically redirected to question four. 
2.  Are you on medication for ADHD? (yes or no) 
3.  How many hours since your last dose of medication for ADHD?      ___ hours 
4.  Have you been diagnosed with a learning disability?  (yes or no) 
5.  Have you been diagnosed with test anxiety? (yes or no) 
6. Are there any other factors that might have impeded your performance in this study?   
The above questions were used as a screening tool to obviate confounds from learning 
disabilities such as dyslexia or dyscalculia that may have influenced participants’ test 
performance.  Those participants who answered “yes” to having being diagnosed with a learning 
disability were replaced.  In total, 9 participants in the ADHD group and 1 participant in the non-
ADHD group were replaced for having been diagnosed with a learning disability. 
In designing the study, consideration was given to the influence of test anxiety and/or 
generalized anxiety on participants’ responses.  It was originally thought that participants who 
indicated a diagnosis of test anxiety or a history of anxiety would be replaced.  The incidence of 
comorbid anxiety with ADHD is quite high, as reflected in the number of “yes” responses to 
question five of the screening questions (test anxiety) and abundant written responses of 
generalized anxiety for question six, most of which, save one, was noted by ADHD participants.  
The rate of comorbid anxiety in ADHD participants for this study was 16%, slightly lower than 
documented average rates for comorbid anxiety (Adler et al., 2007; Brown, 2000; Jensen et al., 
2001; Mayes et al., 2009; Merikangas et al., 2009).  It became difficult to find willing 
participants to volunteer who had a diagnosis of ADHD and had no a history of test anxiety or 
generalized anxiety.  As such, a decision was made to keep data from participants who answered 
“yes” to test anxiety as well as from those who acknowledged a condition of generalized anxiety. 
Medications.  Most medications used to treat ADHD have their effects dissipated within 
12 hours of the initial dose (Johnson & Parker, 2004; see also Table 5 for breakdown).  To 
protect against effects of ADHD medication, participants taking medication for ADHD were 
requested to have a minimum of 12 hours between their last medication dose and the time of the 
study task.  Participants with ADHD who confirmed use of psychotropic medication(s) to treat 
ADHD were instructed to delay taking stimulant medication(s) at least 12 hours before testing if 
they took medication twice a day and 24 hours before testing if they took medication once a day.  
A computerized check during the actual study asked participants to: a) indicate if they had been 
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diagnosed with ADHD; b) indicate if they were on medication for ADHD; and c) indicate how 
many hours it had been since their last dose of such medication.  Of the 64 participants with 
ADHD, 27 (42%) were prescribed stimulant medication.  Of these, one participant had taken 
medication 15 hours prior to testing, one at 17 hours prior to testing, two had taken medication 
20 hours prior to testing, and the remaining 23 participants had taken medication at least 24 
hours or more prior to testing. 
Study Task 1.  Each participant solved a total of 24 base-rate problems in free time by 
providing a probability estimate out of one hundred on the likelihood of group membership (see 
Appendix E).  Using Pennycook et al.’s (2014) instructional manipulation, participants respond 
either according to ‘statistics’ (prior probabilities or base-rates) or according to ‘beliefs’ 
(knowledge of real-world stereotypes).  The goal of the instruction manipulation was two-fold:  
(a) it avoided confusion as to what constituted a “correct” answer; and (b) it made a distinction 
between faster Type 1 processes correlated with intuitive answers and the slower Type 2 
processes correlated with logical/probabilistic thinking.  If utilizing base-rates requires Type 2 
processing, they should not interfere with the processing of the presumably faster belief-based 
judgments, whereas belief-based judgments should always interfere with statistics judgments.  
Problem Type was defined by the congruency between the descriptive information and presented 
base-rates.  Conflict problems were those in which the base-rates and description elicited 
opposing responses; non-conflict problems were those in which the base-rates and description 
elicited the same response.  An example of each is shown here: 
Conflict (Incongruent) Problem:  In a study 1000 people were tested.  Among the 
participants were 996 nurses and 4 doctors.  Paul is a randomly chosen participant of 
this study.  Paul is 34 years old, lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb, is well-
spoken, interested in politics, and invests a lot of time in his career.  What is the 
probability that Paul is a doctor? 
Non-conflict (Congruent) Problem:  In a study 1000 people were tested.  Richard is a 
randomly chosen participant of this study.  Richard is 56 years old.  He is a good public 
speaker and is good at meeting people.  He is a top notch debater and can argue both 
sides of an issue with ease.  Among the participants there were 5 I.T. Technicians and 
995 politicians.  What is the probability that Richard is a politician? 
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Conflict and non-conflict problems were created by interchanging the ratio of small and 
large base-rates, so that a congruent problem can be made incongruent simply by 
switching the base-rate figures.  The following is an example of base-rate alteration to 
offer both conflict and non-conflict problems with similar content: 
Conflict (Incongruent) Problem:  In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the 
participants there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old.  He is not married and is somewhat 
introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and writing computer 
programs. What is the probability that Jack is a lawyer? 
Non-conflict (Congruent) Problem:  In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the 
participants there were 995 engineers and 5 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old.  He is not married and is somewhat 
introverted.  He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and writing computer 
programs. What is the probability that Jack is a lawyer? 
For consistency with previous base-rate reasoning studies, extreme base-rate ratios were 
used (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys et al., 2008; Pennycook et al., 2014; Pennycook 
& Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011).  Three ratios of base-rates were presented an equal 
number of times in problems (995/5; 996/4; 997/3).  The groups that were asked about in the 
final question (e.g., What is the probability that …?) were counterbalanced in such a way that the 
question would pertain to the larger group (e.g., 995) half the time and would pertain to the 
smaller group (e.g., 5) half the time.  Problem Type was manipulated within participants, such 
that half of the problems were conflict and half were non-conflict.  Each participant was 
presented with 12 conflict problems and 12 non-conflict problems, with problems 
counterbalanced so that each problem type appeared equally often in each form across all 
participants and problem content was not repeated within each participant’s set.  Problem order 
was randomized by computer assignment for each participant.  For counterbalancing examples, 
see Appendix F.   
Problems were displayed individually on the computer screen and remained visible to 
participants while they were deliberating on their response.  Participants were given free time to 
determine their answer.  The following exemplifies the instructions displayed on the computer 
screen at the beginning of each trial: 
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For each problem, you will be cued to answer either according to beliefs or according to 
statistics.  When instructed to answer according to your beliefs, this means you must 
answer according to your knowledge of what you think to be true in the world.  For 
example, if you met someone on the street who is dressed in very ragged clothing and 
asking for money, it is a good bet that such a person is homeless.  If you were to be asked 
the probability that such a person is homeless, you would want to give a high probability 
because, based upon our knowledge of the world, people who dress in ragged clothing 
and ask for money on the street are usually homeless.   
By contrast, when instructed to answer according to statistics, this means you must 
assume that your prior beliefs about the world aren’t necessarily relevant.  Instead, you 
should concentrate on the actual probability that something will happen.  For example, if 
you knew that only a small percentage of people in a city were homeless, then you would 
want to give a low probability because, based on statistics, only a small percentage of 
people are homeless. 
The instruction manipulation was counterbalanced across participants, such that the 
problems presented with instructions to respond to “belief” to half the participants were 
presented with instructions to respond according to “statistics” for the other half, and vice versa.  
Participants were prompted with “BELIEF” or “STATISTICS” at the bottom of the screen for 
each problem in a randomized order.  After solving each problem, participants were asked to rate 
the confidence of their answer on a scale of 1 – 9, with “1” reflecting low confidence and “9” 
reflecting high confidence.  As part of the data collection, participants were asked to enter into 
the computer their strategy for responding using “beliefs” as well as their strategy for responding 
with “statistics.” 
Study Task 2.  Upon completion of the base-rate task, participants solved three logic 
questions in free time as obtained from the CRT (see Appendix G).  The CRT is a three-item 
problem-solving task designed to measure the tendency to override an initial erroneous "gut" 
response and to engage in further reflection to find a more suitable answer.  The CRT task is 
evidenced to be a potent predictor of rational thinking performance independent of not only 
intelligence but also executive functioning and thinking dispositions (Toplak et al., 2014).  
Accuracy on the CRT is positively correlated with abilities on decision-making tasks (Frederick, 
2005; Toplak et al., 2011, 2014); analytic reasoning tasks (De Neys, 2013; Toplak et al., 2011, 
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2014), and has been found to be negatively correlated with religious beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012).  Responses for the CRT identify reasoners who tend to be 
stingy with cognitive resources – that is, the unwillingness to engage Type 2 processes and 
working memory to engage in further reasoning, which is also a marker for thinking disposition 
(Toplak et al., 2014).  For example, cognitive misers tend to give the first response that comes to 
mind without further attention to the validity of their answer (Toplak et al., 2014) whereas more 
analytic thinkers tend to think past the intuitive answer to derive a more suitable response.   
RESULTS 
The experiment consisted of a 2 x 2 x 2 [participant (ADHD, non-ADHD) x description 
(conflict, non-conflict) x instruction (answer using beliefs, answer using statistics)] mixed-
factorial design.  The factor of “participants” was classified as a “between-subject” factor; 
factors of “description” and “instruction” were classified as “within-subject factors.”  The 
following dependent variables were examined:  probability estimates recorded as a mean ratio of 
participants’ accuracies; mean confidence judgments, recorded using a scale of 1 – 9; response 
times (RTs), measured in milliseconds; CRT response accuracies, measured as a mean ratio of 
the number correct; and CRT RTs, measured in milliseconds. 
Missing Values 
 No missing values were recorded.   
Data Cleaning and Rescoring 
 Prior to evaluating the hypotheses of the current research, data were screened for issues 
concerning the normality of the distribution (e.g., outliers, skewness, and kurtosis) that may have 
affected the analysis and/or interpretation of the results.  An initial exploratory analysis using 
SPSS statistical software was carried out to identify data points judged to be outliers for 
dependent variables of probability estimates, RTs, confidence ratings and CRT RTs were deleted 
from the data set before analyses.  CRT responses were coded either as 1 for mathematically 
correct or 0 for incorrect. 
  To facilitate data analyses, responses from base-rate problems were rescored so that 
high scores always reflected answers that were consistent with the correct response as per the 
response instruction.  More explicitly, when the correct answer according to instructions 
specified a low probability, response estimates were subtracted from 100.  To illustrate rescoring, 
the example of the lawyer/engineer conflict problem is given: 
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In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 engineers and 
995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old.  
He is not married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading 
science fiction and writing computer programs. What is the probability Jack is a lawyer? 
When responding under the statistics instruction, the correct answer that Jack is a lawyer 
would indicate a high probability.  In this case, no rescoring of the data is necessary.  However, 
if the question was changed to “what is the probability that Jack is an engineer,” the correct 
response according to “statistics” would be 0%.  In this case, all responses, regardless of the 
number, were rescored (100 – response) to ensure that high scores reflected correct answers.  
Using this same example, but under a “belief” instruction, the correct answer for “what is the 
probability Jack is an engineer” would suggest a high probability estimate and no rescoring was 
required, regardless of participants’ estimates.  However, when asked about the probability of 
being a lawyer under the “belief” instruction, the correct answer should be “0.”  In this case, all 
responses were rescored (100 – response), to ensure that high scores reflected correct answers.   
Individual repeated-measures ANOVAs were used to analyze the 128 participant 
responses for probability estimates, confidence ratings, and RTs.  Post hoc paired t-tests were 
used to interpret any interactions, together with Bonferroni corrections to control for inflation of 
Type 1 error.  Means and standard deviations for estimates, confidence ratings, and RTs are 
reported in the Tables section.  Graphed means for interactions are shown in the Figures section.  
 Responses for the three CRT questions were recoded, such that mathematically correct 
answers were coded as 1 and incorrect answers were coded as 0.  Mean CRT responses for each 
participant were converted to a percent to reflect 0 for none correct, 33 for one correct, 67 for 
two correct, and 100 for three correct.  Means of CRT responses were analyzed using a t-test to 
determine differences in performance differences between groups, as measured by accuracy.  
Additionally, a bivariate correlation was carried out to determine associations between CRT 
responses, responses under the belief instruction, and responses under the statistic instruction.   
Analysis of Probability Estimates 
 The means for the 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of probability estimates are shown in Tables 6-9.  
Graphed results and histograms of probability estimates are illustrated in Figures 3-8.  Means for 
probability estimates are reported as a ratio of accuracy, with 100 representing a correct answer 
in all conditions.  Interactions were parsed with t-tests using a Bonferroni correction (α = .025).  
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The manipulation of problem congruency allowed interference to be measured between the two 
processing systems (Type 1 and Type 2) when problem-solving.  As expected, a main effect of 
congruency was observed, F(1,121) = 202.27, MSE = 255.20, p < .001, ηp2= .626), which 
revealed the anticipated higher accuracies for non-conflict problems (M = 86.63, SD = 10.14) 
relative to conflict problems (M = 65.88, SD = 15.16).  A main effect of group, F(1,121) = 9.62, 
MSE = 383.56, p =.002, ηp2= .074), and instruction, F(1,121) = 19.88, MSE =475.83, p < .001, 
ηp2= .141), was qualified by a Group x Instruction interaction, (F(1,121)= 4.34, MSE = 475.83, p 
=.039, ηp2 = .035).  The interaction was deconstructed using a paired t- test to measure 
differences in observed means between groups for the two response instructions.  For the control 
group, a mean difference of 4.67% between the two response instructions was found to be non-
significant (t(60) = 1.62, SE = 2.88, p = .110).  That is, the control group had similar accuracies 
whether responding with beliefs or statistics.  For ADHD participants, a mean difference of 
12.87% between the two response instructions was found to be significant (t(61) = 4.80, SE = 
2.68, p < .001).  These differences remained significant after a Bonferroni correction (α = .0125).  
Specifically, the ADHD group performed significantly better for the statistic instruction relative 
to the belief instruction (M = 84.97 SD = 16.43) and (M = 72.49, SD = 13.03), respectively, 
whereas for the control group, estimates for statistics and beliefs were relatively similar, M = 
76.02 (SD = 16.44) and M = 71.40 (SD = 12.48), respectively.  Consequently, while both ADHD 
participants and controls were observed to have similar accuracies when solving problems with 
beliefs, the ADHD participants revealed significantly higher accuracies when solving problems 
with statistics, suggesting their problem-solving technique for the conflict/statistic condition was 
somewhat different than controls. 
Marginally significant differences in means were observed for the 3-way interaction, 
F(1,121) = 3.54, MSE = 536.04, p = .062, ηp2= .028), which revealed the ADHD group to have 
equal or better accuracy performance relative to controls.  Despite principles of sequential 
processing outlined in the default interventionist model of reasoning and the inference of one-
way interference (beliefs interfere with base-rates, not vice versa), graphed results of probability 
estimates (Figure 3) clearly illustrate two-way interference on conflict problems.  Specifically, 
control participants had similar accuracy when resolving conflict with beliefs (M = 60.78, SD = 
23.25) as when resolving conflict with statistics (M = 64.68, SD = 28.92).  The comparable 
accuracies suggest that base-rates interfered with beliefs to the same extent that beliefs interfered 
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with base-rates, an observance that substantiates the accessibility of base-rates to Type 1 
processes.  This finding supports a parallel processing model, in which dual streaming Type 1 
processes deliver multiple outputs derived from base-rates and beliefs, both of which must then 
be compared and contrasted to make a final judgment.   
Similarly, the ADHD group’s accuracy when resolving conflict with beliefs (M = 59.13, 
SD = 25.83) was also comparable to the control group’s accuracy when resolving conflict with 
beliefs (M = 60.78, SD = 23.25), indicating similar levels of interference from base-rates in the 
conflict/belief condition.  However, what is striking is that the ADHD group had considerably 
less interference from beliefs when resolving conflict with statistics, as illustrated by the ADHD 
group’s higher accuracy rates in the conflict/statistic condition (M = 78.93, SD = 24.34) relative 
to controls (M = 64.68, SD = 28.92).  Thus, while the control group’s interference from beliefs 
when solving with conflict problems with statistics was similar to what has been observed in 
similar studies (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2014; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012, but see De Neys, 
2012 for a review), clearly something was happening with the ADHD group to produce such 
high accuracy rates in the conflict/statistics condition.   
Analysis of Response Times for Probability Estimates 
 The means for the 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of response times (RTs) are shown in Tables 10-13 
and graphed in Figures 9 and 10.  Means for RTs are reported in milliseconds.  Interactions were 
interpreted with t-tests using a Bonferroni correction (α = .0125).  A main effect of congruency, 
F(1,114) = 22.48, MSE = 21033843.88. p < .001, ηp2 = .165), and instruction, F(1,114) = 16.83, 
MSE = 45600276.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .129), and a non-significant effect of group, F(1,114) = 
3.60, MSE = 150481901.31, p = .060, ηp2 = .031, formed a Group x Instruction x Congruency 
interaction, F(1,114) = 7.20, MSE = 15747438.89, p = .008, ηp2 = .059).  The marginally 
significant main effect of group (p = .060) is manifested as a cross-over effect for the non-
conflict/statistic condition in the deconstruction of the three-way interaction, illustrated in Figure 
10.  Evidence that base-rates interfered with belief judgments to the same extent that stereotypes 
interfered with statistical judgments was demonstrated by congruency effects of increased RT for 
conflict problems relative to non-conflict.  The three-way interaction reveals the joint effects of 
all three factors on RT.  That is, RT depended on the interaction of group membership, 
instruction, and congruency.  To parse out the 3-way interaction, a two-way ANOVA of Group x 
Instruction was initially run using only conflict problems.  This revealed main effects for 
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instruction for conflict problems (F(1,119) = 12.77, MSE = 36165780.20, p = .001 ηp2  = .097), 
such that overall latencies under the belief instruction for conflict problems (M = 20734.97, SD = 
10176.31) were longer than latencies under the statistic instruction (M = 17123.49, SD = 
6567.54).  A main effect of group was also observed for conflict problems (F(1,119) = 4.17, 
MSE = 945751.82.77, p = .043 ηp2  = .034), such that the ADHD group took longer to solve 
conflict problems (M = 18278.52, SD = 5838.48) relative to the control group (M = 16117.54, SD 
= 6405.56).  No interaction effects were observed for factors of group and instruction in conflict 
problems (F(1,119) = .001, MSE = 361657.80.20, p = .979, ηp2  < .001).  A second ANOVA of 
Group x Instruction was then run for non-conflict-problems.  This revealed a main effect of 
Instruction (F(1,118) = 15.37, MSE = 25296674.98, p < .001 ηp2  = .115), but no main effects of 
group (F(1,118) = 2.35, MSE = 80710040.22, p = .128 ηp2  = .020).  Together this formed an 
Instruction x Group interaction, (F(1,118) = 9.32, MSE = 25296674.98, p = .003 ηp2  = .073).  
Paired t-tests revealed that the control group’s RTs for non-conflict problems were similar when 
solving with beliefs (M = 16016.84, SD = 7488.01) and statistics (M = 15331.02, SD = 7162.60), 
(t(61) = .715, SE = 788.99, p = .478).  However, the ADHD group had significantly longer RTs 
when resolving non-conflict problems with beliefs (M = 20400.91, SD = 9116.25) relative to 
solving non-conflict problems with statistics (M = 15360.94, SD = 5174.62), (t(57) = 4.33, SE = 
1045.79, p <.001).  This finding remained significant with a Bonferroni correction (α = .0125).   
 The observed pattern of response latencies is quite intriguing, as it exposes undeniable 
difficulties experienced by the ADHD group that went undetected in the analyses of probability 
estimates.  Plotted results in Figure 9 provide a closer look at RT differences among various 
conditions.  Symmetrical RTs for the ADHD group in both conflict and non-conflict belief 
conditions (M = 22014 and M = 20401, respectively) strongly suggest that, despite equivalent 
accuracies relative to the control group for problems solved with beliefs, the ADHD group 
struggled to extract the meaning of the protracted personality descriptions.  Compelling evidence 
of the ADHD group’s difficulty to encode descriptions lies in the observation that problem 
congruency did not appear to influence RTs; that is, ADHD participants took just as long to 
solve conflict problems with beliefs as they did non-conflict, suggesting a high level of difficulty 
interpreting and encoding the lengthy and ambiguous descriptions.  By comparison, the control 
group’s significantly longer RTs for conflict/belief problems (M = 19456) relative to non-
conflict/belief problems (M = 16017) signify the congruency effects one would expect. 
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 Interestingly, the pattern of response latencies for problems solved with statistics also 
exposed performance difficulties for the ADHD group.  Although probability estimates for the 
ADHD group were much higher than controls in conflict/statistic condition (M = 79 vs. M = 65, 
respectively), RTs between the two groups reveal the ADHD group to require significantly 
longer latencies than controls (M = 18400 vs. M = 15826, respectively) to solve problems in the 
conflict/statistic condition.  Moreover, a comparison of differences between groups in both the 
conflict/statistic and non-conflict/statistic conditions is illuminating.  The control group exhibits 
symmetrical RTs between the conflict/statistic condition (M = 15826) and non-conflict/statistic 
condition (M = 15331), suggesting that for the control group, solving conflict problems with 
statistics was no more difficult than solving non-conflict problems with statistics.  Conversely, 
the ADHD group’s significantly longer RTs when solving problems in the conflict/statistic 
condition (M = 18400) as compared to the non-conflict/statistic condition (M = 15361) clearly 
indicates that, despite higher accuracies, the ADHD had far more difficulty solving problems in 
the conflict/statistic condition.  Longer RTs in the conflict/statistic condition by ADHD 
participants are at odds with their substantially higher accuracy rates for the same condition.  
Given the ADHD group’s evidenced struggles to process the wordy descriptions when asked to 
solve problems with beliefs (discussed above), one would assume that difficulties encoding 
descriptions would result in less interference from beliefs when resolving conflict with statistics, 
thus eliciting higher accuracies under the statistics instruction.  However, the need for longer 
latencies when solving conflict problems with statistics certainly implies difficulties and refutes 
assumptions of minimal interference from beliefs.  From the pattern of RTs, it is clear the ADHD 
group was having more difficulties solving conflict/statistic problems than controls, which can 
only be attributed to difficulties with inhibiting interference.  Thus, while the ADHD group may 
have had difficulty encoding the descriptions, they must have encoded them well enough to 
create significant interference when resolving conflict with statistics.  Hence, longer RTs for the 
ADHD group in the conflict/statistic condition are likely due to the additional time required by 
ADHD reasoners to overcome inhibitory deficits and suppress interference from beliefs. 
 Altogether, the analysis for response latencies has revealed a clearer picture of what is 
happening during problem-solving for the ADHD group and reflect two areas of difficulty that 
ADHD participants struggled with.  First, the symmetrical pattern of longer RTs in both the 
conflict/belief and non-conflict/belief conditions clearly indicates that the ADHD group had 
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considerable trouble encoding wordy personality sketches.  A second finding is that, despite the 
ADHD group’s difficulty encoding the lengthy descriptions, they did encode them sufficiently to 
produce interference when solving conflict problems with statistics.   The longer RTs observed 
for ADHD reasoners when resolving conflict problems with statistics likely expose the predicted 
inhibitory deficits associated with ADHD and how ADHD reasoners overcome these deficits. 
Analysis of Confidence Ratings 
 The means for the 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of confidence ratings are shown in Tables 14-17.  
Mean confidence ratings were documented using a scale of 1-9, with “1” reflecting low 
confidence and “9” reflecting high confidence.  As expected, congruency effects were echoed in 
confidence ratings (F(1,123) = 61.15, MSE = .356, p < .001, ηp2 = .332), with participants having 
more confidence in their responses for non-conflict problems (M = 7.62, SD = .89) than conflict 
problems (M = 7.20, SD = 1.00), further evidencing effects of two-way interference of base-rates 
and stereotypes.  Consistent with accuracy rates for estimates, a main effect of instruction 
(F(1,123) = 9.00, MSE = 1.40, p = .003, ηp2 = .068) showed confidence ratings to be higher when 
responding with statistics (M = 7.55, SD = 1.10), than when responding with beliefs (M = 7.29, 
SD = .960), an observation that supports the implementation of a cost-effective strategy by both 
groups of reasoners.  Mean confidence ratings between groups were not significantly different, 
F(1,123) = 1.49, MSE = 3.23, p = .225, ηp2 = .012),  with similar confidence ratings for the 
control group (M  = 7.51, SD = .82) relative to the ADHD group (M = 7.31, SD = .97).  No 
significant interactions between factors for confidence ratings were observed.  What is curious is 
that even though the longer RTs in specific conditions for the ADHD group suggest more 
difficulty solving these problems, no interactive effects were observed in confidence ratings. 
This implies that, while the ADHD group had difficulties with both encoding beliefs and 
inhibiting interference, the extended RTs provided them with the additional means to attain 
accuracy rates similar to that of controls, thus eliciting comparable confidence ratings. 
Analysis of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
Group means for CRT responses, RTs, and correlations are listed in Tables 18-21.  In 
contrast to expectations, no significant group differences reported on the CRT task, t(126) = 
1.82, SE = 6.31, p =.071, with a mean percent correct for the ADHD group (46.34) observed to 
be only slightly higher than that for the control group (34.86).  CRT measures were consistent in 
that accuracy under the statistics instruction was correlated with accuracy of CRT responses (N = 
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125, r = 0.374, p < .001, α= .01).  The correlation is not surprising, as reasoners who are able to 
engage Type 2 processes and successfully inhibit the initially intuitive belief response on CRT 
problems should also have proficiency with problem-solving when responding with statistics.  
Alternatively, the correlation may be due to numerical competency, as both problem types 
involve a facility with numbers.  A similar pattern of correlation between CRT responses and the 
belief instruction was not revealed (N = 126, r =.023, p = .797, α= .05).  In other words, CRT 
responses, which are correlated with thinking style (i.e., whether one has tendencies of miserly 
information processing or a deeper analytic style of thinking) were not associated with one’s 
capacity to solve problems intuitively using beliefs based on experiential knowledge.  The 
equivalent CRT scores between groups are, at face value, counterintuitive to expectations, as 
inhibitory deficits should have constituted poorer performance for the ADHD group.   
Consistent with group differences in RTs on the base-rate task, significant differences 
were observed between groups for latencies in the CRT task, t(120) = 2.25, SE = 4257.60, p 
=.026), with the ADHD group taking longer to resolve CRT problems (M = 46210.33, SD = 
24920.33) than the control group (M = 36626.88, SD = 22016.67).  The longer RTs for the CRT 
task by the ADHD group align with the longer latencies observed for the ADHD group when 
resolving conflict in base-rate problems and support assumptions that inhibitory deficits may be 
manifested in response latencies.  Thus, longer RTs for the ADHD group in the CRT task may be 
due to the additional time required to successfully suppress the inappropriate response. 
 This concludes the overview of results for the current study.  Chapter Four will provide a 
discussion of the findings, including practical implications for education, limitations of the study, 
future directions for further study, and concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 DISCUSSION 
It was very surprising to observe that accuracy rates for participants with ADHD were not 
lower relative to their non-ADHD counterparts when asked to solve base-rate problems with 
statistics.  Moreover, results from the CRT task revealed the ADHD group to be on par in 
accuracy relative to the control group in solving CRT problems.  Considering ADHD is 
predominantly linked to difficulties in inhibition, attention to tasks, and using working memory 
effectively (Barkley, 1997b, Brown, 2008, Clark et al., 2007), this was entirely unexpected.  
Discussion of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
The CRT was based on the original work of Frederick (2005) and further studied, among 
others, by Toplak et al. (2011, 2014).  The logic of the CRT requires the assumption that 
intuitive responses cued by the problems are common to most reasoners, but that the tendency 
and ability to inhibit and override these prominent intuitions depends on individual differences in 
thinking styles (Pennycook, Cheyne et al., 2015).  The CRT has been touted as the hallmark for 
evaluating the ability to “reflect upon and ultimately override the intuitive responses” 
(Pennycook, Cheyne et al., 2015, p. 2).  Accuracy rates observed by the ADHD group on this 
task did not reveal the widely acknowledged inhibitory deficits.  Specifically, both groups 
correctly answered about one out of the three CRT questions, a figure that correlates with 
performance for web-based and college samples (Pennycook, Cheyne et al., 2015), and one that 
was slightly lower than had by students from Ivy League colleges, such as Princeton and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Frederick, 2005).  Given the inhibitory deficits 
associated with ADHD, one wonders how they managed to match the control group’s accuracy 
levels.  Perhaps the answer can be found in the significantly longer latencies observed for the 
ADHD group.  It is possible that the longer RTs are manifestations of their inhibitory control 
deficiencies3.  Thus, to fully engage the executive inhibitory mechanism and successfully supress 
the intuitive response, the ADHD group require longer latencies relative to the control group.  
While inhibitory impairments likely made the process of inhibiting the intuitive, through 
erroneous, answer more difficult, the additional RT facilitated performance levels that matched 
controls.  Unlike the base-rate task, the CRT task does not support strategy use.  One must inhibit 
                                                 
3 V. Thompson, personal communication, May 4, 2016 
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the intuitive response and perform a mathematical operation to compute the correct answer.  
Although math competency could be related to problem-solving proficiency, given the inhibitory 
deficits linked to ADHD, it is more likely that longer RTs for the ADHD group needed to solve 
CRT problems are attributable to overcoming inhibitory deficits rather than to math difficulties.   
Discussion of Base-Rate Task 
 Conflict Detection.  Similar probability estimates for the control group when solving 
conflict problems under both the belief and statistic instructions clearly reveal that base-rates 
interfered with beliefs to the same extent that beliefs interfered with base-rates, also known as 
two-way interference.  This contradicts explicit operational tenets outlined for serial models of 
dual process theories that stipulate one-way interference (beliefs should only interfere with base-
rates, not vice versa).  Also evidenced were strikingly similar reduced accuracy rates for both 
groups when solving conflict problems under the belief instruction, indicating interference from 
base-rates.  The symmetrical estimates for both groups demonstrate that both groups were, at 
least implicitly, aware of conflict from base-rates when solving problems with beliefs and these 
base-rates interfered to the same extent for both groups.  The observation of two-way 
interference verifying the accessibility of base-rates to Type 1 processes matches that of previous 
reasoning studies that also used extended base-rates as stimuli for base-rate problem solving (see 
De Neys, 2012 for a review, but also see Pennycook et al., 2012, 2014; Pennycook & Thompson, 
2012; Thompson et al., in press; Thompson & Johnson, 2014).  Further evidence of early conflict 
detection was also revealed through increased RTs for both groups on conflict problems relative 
to non-conflict problems and by decreased confidence ratings by both groups on conflict 
problems as compared to non-conflict.  Altogether, these findings offer additional support for 
claims that easily distinguishable base-rates (e.g., 997/3) are accessible to Type 1 processes, 
reinforcing the idea that humans have a probabilistic intuition for processing extreme base-rates 
(De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2014, Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 
in press; Thompson & Johnson, 2014), regardless if reasoners have responded with beliefs or 
probability.  Thus, it is possible for reasoners to have several Type 1 processes streaming parallel 
judgements – one derived from base-rates and one derived from beliefs.   
 The question remains as to how reasoners resolve conflict between two Type 1 outputs 
founded on contradictory sources of information.  Not surprisingly, a congruency effect was 
evidenced in the analysis of RTs, such that conflict problems required more time to resolve than 
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non-conflict problems, an observation that supports conflict detection in reasoning.  What is 
more interesting, though, is a main effect of group for response latencies in conflict problems, 
such that ADHD reasoners took much longer to solve conflict problems than controls.  If, in fact, 
longer latencies are a manifestation of inhibitory deficits, then by extension, a case could be 
made to support assumptions that engagement of Type 2 processes (and thus inhibitory control) 
is necessary to resolve the conflict between two parallel streaming Type 1 outputs (De Neys, 
2012; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2014), one derived from beliefs and the other from base-rates. 
Solving with Statistics. A wealth of solid evidence, including that of executive function 
tests (e.g., go/no-go task, Stroop task, Stop task, Continuous Performance Test), neuroimaging 
studies, and neuro-physiological studies overwhelmingly support disinhibition theories as a 
primary dysfunction in ADHD (Barkley, 1997b, but see Nigg & Barkley, 2014).  Despite this 
evidence, accuracy rates on a base-rate task widely thought to demand inhibitory control did not 
reveal the expected poorer reasoning abilities for the ADHD group.   
Significantly higher accuracy rates observed by the ADHD group in the conflict/statistic 
condition (Figures 3 and 4) suggest that when asked to resolve conflict problems using statistics, 
ADHD reasoners recognized the conflict and did a better job of resolving this conflict relative to 
controls.  In spite of their superior performance, confidence ratings for the ADHD group were 
revealed to be similar to that of controls.  This raises the question of how ADHD thinkers 
reasoned through the problems requiring a statistical response.  Overall RTs for both groups 
under the statistics instruction were observed to be notably lower than when solving problems 
under the belief instruction.  This implies that when problem-solving with statistics, both groups 
likely implemented a cost-effective strategy to rapidly extract the clear, salient, numerical base-
rate information– a strategy that could not be applied when problem-solving with beliefs.  
However, from the observed higher accuracy rates of the ADHD group, it appears that ADHD 
reasoners were both more uniform and persistent in applying this numerical strategy than their 
non-ADHD counterparts.  Notwithstanding their resolute strategy use that likely resulted in 
higher accuracies, the pattern of RTs revealed the ADHD group to require more time to solve 
problems in the conflict/statistic condition relative to controls, suggesting they experienced more 
difficulty with these problems than controls. 
Response latencies for controls when resolving conflict problems with statistics reveals 
similar behavioral patterns as that found in other base-rate studies (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2014; 
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Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Thompson & Johnson, 2014).  Specifically, when resolving 
conflict problems with statistics, controls appear to trade-off accuracy in favor of speed, thus 
demonstrating symmetrical response latencies between conflict problems solved with statistics 
and non-conflict problems solved with statistics.  However, this rapid response time in the 
conflict/statistic condition costs them in accuracy, ostensibly due to interference from beliefs.  
Alternatively, the ADHD group was observed to do the reverse, in that they relinquished 
speed in favor of accuracy when resolving conflict with statistics.  Thus, unlike controls, ADHD 
reasoners were observed to have significantly longer latencies for the conflict/statistic condition 
relative to the non-conflict/ statistic condition, but this trade-off benefited them in terms of 
accuracy, as shown by considerably higher accuracy rates when resolving conflict with statistics.    
The parsimonious explanation for the different approaches between groups is likely due 
to conflict effects and the speed and proficiency with which the respective groups can inhibit 
interference.  The control group was not assumed to have inhibitory deficits; hence, they could 
presumably solve conflict problems with greater speed but compromised some accuracy in the 
process (i.e., accuracy traded for speed).  The ADHD group, however, are known to have 
inhibitory deficits that likely hampered their speed and proficiency for problem-solving in the 
conflict/statistic condition.  Thus, just as with the CRT task, the observed longer response 
latencies for ADHD participants in the conflict/statistic condition may be an index of the 
inhibitory deficits associated with ADHD and the time it takes to overcome these deficits.4   
Accordingly, when resolving problems with statistics, ADHD reasoners required longer latencies 
to inhibit interference from beliefs, but if given the time to do so, they were more consistent at 
inhibiting interference (i.e., speed traded for accuracy).  Thus, it is not that ADHD reasoners 
cannot successfully engage inhibitory control; it is that it takes them longer to engage this 
control but can eventually respond with the same confidence as their non-ADHD peers.   
Moreover, when provided this extended time to resolve conflict with statistics, they appear to 
demonstrate more consistency and persistence in applying this inhibitory control than controls. 
Solving with Beliefs.  The observation that ADHD reasoners required similar latencies to 
solve problems under the belief instruction (Figures 9 and 10) exposes additional difficulties for 
ADHD reasoners.  Symmetrical latencies for ADHD reasoners when problem-solving with 
                                                 
4 V.Thompson, personal communication, May 4, 2016 
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beliefs, regardless of the congruency of the problems (conflict or non-conflict), suggest that the 
ADHD group had great difficulty encoding the prolix descriptions.  Thus, although ADHD 
reasoners’ accuracy rates for solving with beliefs was equal to controls, it took them significantly 
longer to achieve this parallel performance, even when solving problems that did not contain 
conflict.  This finding supports the vast literature citing working memory and processing speed 
inefficiencies in the ADHD brain (Au et al., 2014; Holmes et al., 2010; Lewandowski, Lovett, 
Parolin, Gordon, & Codding, 2007; Martinussen et al., 2005; Willcutt et al., 2012) and provides 
an explanation as to why students with ADHD often require extended time to complete school 
course work and exams.  Interestingly, observed confidence ratings revealed no differences in 
certainty of responses between groups when solving all problems with beliefs.  Once again, this 
suggests that, despite the difficulties experienced by ADHD reasoners, given enough time they 
can respond with the same confidence as their non-ADHD counterparts.  Altogether, this justifies 
common policies by school administrators to provide extra time to students with ADHD as a 
means to facilitate their academic success and progression to higher academic levels.   
High Capacity Reasoners  
Interestingly, the pattern of thinking observed in the ADHD group is similar to that found 
in high-capacity (IQ) reasoners (Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al., in press), 
although likely for different reasons.  Thompson and Johnson (2014) and Thompson et al. (in 
press) observed that differences in reasoning based on cognitive style may emerge at an early 
stage in processing (Peters, 2012; Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll, & Mertz, 2008).  When applied to the 
ADHD group, it could be that the observed numerical proficiencies are the result of a cognitive 
affinity for processing numeracies in the default stage of processing.  However, longer latencies 
on conflict problems for the ADHD group relative to the control group (Figures 9 and 10) would 
not support a claim of numerical proficiency for ADHD reasoners.  Peters et al. (2006) note that 
numerate reasoners are more deliberate in numerical comparisons, use appropriate numerical 
principles when comparing probabilities, and are less vulnerable to being misled by tempting, 
but non-relevant, information.  However, average accuracy on the CRT task (on par with the 
control group) does not suggest that ADHD reasoners have anything beyond average skills in 
numerical reasoning. 
The ADHD group’s demonstrated style of numerical reasoning is unlikely to be attributed 
to higher cognitive capacity, as Thompson and Johnson (2014) and Thompson et al. (in press) 
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observed in their studies of high capacity reasoners.  Results are generally mixed regarding 
differences in general intelligence for individuals with ADHD, but if anything, an argument can 
be made for lower cognitive capacity, not higher, most notably with respect to fluid reasoning 
(Barkley, 1997b).  Bridgett and Walker’s (2006) meta-analytic review of intellectual differences 
between adults with and without ADHD found that differences on Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS) intelligence tests between ADHD and non-ADHD adults were small and not 
clinically meaningful.  However, the presence of a comorbid disorder put ADHD adults more at 
risk for lower general intellectual ability relative to non-ADHD adults.  Thus, based on the 
random sample of ADHD university students, it is unlikely that the results demonstrating ADHD 
reasoners to be significantly better at analytic reasoning were due to higher cognitive capacity.  
Adherence to Instructions 
Various explanations for this unexpected phenomenon must be ruled out before any 
implications of the results can be considered.  There is no evidence that ADHD reasoners were 
successful at reasoning tasks under the statistic instruction because they are generally better at 
following instructions.  In that case, ADHD reasoners would have surpassed controls under both 
the belief and response instruction; instead, they were better in decision-making only under the 
statistic instruction.   
ADHD and Hyper-focusing 
One could argue that these results fit with the contention that individuals with ADHD 
have the ability to hyper-focus on a task when it is interesting or engaging.  Take for example, 
the ADHD child who can focus for length periods on a stimulating computer game, oblivious to 
the world around him.  This phenomenon of hyper-focusing is common to individuals with 
ADHD, to the point where they are unconscious of their surroundings when they are doing 
something they really enjoy (Johnson-Quan, 2014).  They may focus on a task so intensely that 
they are in a trance-like state, wherein they are not distractible and can often get a tremendous 
amount of work done.  Schuck and Crinella (2005) observe that under conditions that minimize 
distractions, a student with ADHD can often solve complex problems better than he or she 
performs on simple laboratory tests of executive function.  As the participants self-selected into 
the study by responding to advertisements, ADHD volunteers may have been highly motivated to 
participate in a reasoning study.  This argument, though, does not account for the asymmetrical 
performance of ADHD reasoners between instruction conditions.   
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Assessment Measures of Rationality 
One factor that we may be missing in educational pedagogies as well as psycho-
educational assessment and evaluation is attention to the malleability of problem-solving through 
learned reasoning strategies.  Stanovich, West, and Toplak (2012) and Stanovich and Stanovich 
(2010) argue that the ability to reason rationally requires three mental qualities:  (a) an 
algorithmic-level cognitive capacity is required in order for inhibition and decontextualization 
activities to be sustained; (b) a reflective mind, characterized by the tendency to override 
inappropriate responses generated by the autonomous mind and to initiate deeper thinking that 
will produce a more optimal response; and (c) possession of cognitive mindware that allows the 
computation of a rational response.   
Gaps in mindware are most easily remediable, as these gaps are entirely due to missing 
strategies and declarative knowledge, both of which can be taught (Stanovich & Stanovich, 
2010).  It is possible that ADHD reasoners are aware of their cognitive limitations and 
consistently depend on mindware skills of strategy use to mitigate executive function deficits, at 
least as demonstrated in this study.   
 Traditional quantitative psychometric measures, such as the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children (WISC) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) have failed us when it 
comes to evaluations of rationality (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010).  Existing 
intelligence tests based on Gf/Gc theory – derived from the Cattell/Horn/Carroll (CHC) theory of 
intelligence (Carroll, 1993) – postulate that tests of intelligence tap a small number of broad 
factors, two of which are dominant – fluid reasoning (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc).  
These tests measure algorithmic level cognitive capacity or computational efficiency, but not the 
tendency for rational thinking, or rationality (Stanovich, 2009, Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010; 
Stanovich et al., 2012).  Thus, we may be missing an important area of evaluation when 
assessing individuals with ADHD.  Tests of fluid reasoning (often the Raven matrices) measure 
the computational ability of the algorithmic mind to sustain decoupling, but do not measure 
one’s proclivity or ability to inhibit a prepotent response or measure the mindware tools mentally 
available to an individual.  With respect to fluid intelligence, the mindware of rational thought 
clusters around domains of probabilistic, causal, and scientific reasoning (see Stanovich, 2009), 
whereas subtests of crystallized intelligence assess vocabulary, verbal comprehension domains, 
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and general knowledge on very broad areas.  Thus, traditional measures of fluid reasoning 
evaluate rationality only indirectly and to a small extent, whereas measures of crystallized 
intelligence do not evaluate individual differences of rationality to any degree.   
PASS Theory 
A clearer understanding of how the ADHD brain functions with respect to strategy use 
might be explained within the framework of the PASS theory of executive functioning (Das, 
Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994).  This model of executive control is based on the seminal writings of 
A.R. Luria (1980) and his observations of brain-injured patients.  Originally conceived by Das, 
Kar, and Parrila (1996), the PASS theory of intelligence holds that cognitive functioning consists 
of multiple domains that reflect the interaction of the individual’s biological predispositions with 
the environment and cultural context.  The PASS model organizes cognition within four primary 
areas of the brain:  Planning, Attention, Simultaneous Processing, and Successive Processing 
(PASS).  Emerging research holds promise for a measurement tool of cognitive processes using 
the Cognitive Assessment Tool (CAS; Das et al., 1994; Naglieri & Das, 1997, 2002, 2005) rather 
than conventional intelligence tests of the WISC and WAIS that assess cognitive abilities.  
Grounded in PASS theory, the CAS is designed to assess cognitive processes as characterized by 
the PASS theory:  planning, attention, simultaneous processing, and successive processing.  This 
novel approach to understanding brain function may provide a more accurate cognitive 
assessment of individuals with executive functioning deficits. 
As described by Naglieri and Das (1997, 2002, 2005), the first system, planning, is 
located in the frontal lobes and involves executive functions responsible for controlling and 
organizing behaviour, selecting and constructing strategies, problem-solving, and monitoring 
performance.  The second system, attention, is managed by broad areas of the frontal lobe as 
well as lower parts of the cortex and the parietal lobes.  This brain region regulates attention and 
is responsible for maintaining arousal levels and alertness and ensuring focus on relevant stimuli.  
A third system of information processing occurs in the posterior region or the back of the brain 
and involves two processes to encode, transform, and retain information.  Simultaneous 
processing is engaged when the relationship between items and their integration into whole units 
of information is required, such as recognizing figures or understanding the context of a sentence 
as a whole (e.g., a circle within a square vs. a square within a circle, or the difference between 
‘he had a shower before breakfast’ and ‘he had breakfast before a shower.’)  Lastly, successive 
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processing is required for organizing separate items in a sequence, such as remembering a 
sequence of words or actions exactly in the order in which they had just been presented.  
Simultaneous processing is largely associated with the occipital and the parietal lobes while 
successive processing is generally associated with the frontal-temporal lobes.   
It is the first system of cognitive operation, planning, that is most relevant to this study 
and the findings.  If ADHD is an impairment of self-regulation assumed to be governed by 
prefrontal lobe functions (Goldberg, 2001), than a connection between the disorder and the 
conceptualization of cognitive process under the theoretical framework of PASS can be made.  
Goldberg describes ADHD executive dysfunction in the planning region as “poor planning and 
foresight, combined with diminished impulse control and exaggerated affective volatility” (p. 
179).  PASS profiles studied on children with ADHD using the CAS support the existing view 
that ADHD-C is more of dysfunction with executive processes of self-regulation than attention 
(Barkley, 1997b).  Paolitto (1999) compared children with ADHD to those without and found 
that children with ADHD-C received significantly lower scores on the CAS Planning Scale than 
those without.  Similarly, Naglieri, Goldstein, Iseman, and Schwebach (2003) also found that 
children with ADHD demonstrated reliably lower scores on the Planning Scale of the CAS and, 
notably, were observed to have a dissimilar PASS profile than children diagnosed with anxiety 
disorders (for a review, see Naglieri, 2005).  More recently, similar findings of low scores on the 
Planning Scale of the CAS have been replicated with Dutch children by Van Luit, Kroesbergen, 
and Naglieri (2005).  When contrasted against PASS profiles reported for children with low 
scores only on scales of Successive Processing, such as those with reading disorders and children 
with anxiety (no weaknesses revealed on PASS profile), there appears to be strong support for a 
PASS profile that is specific to individuals with ADHD.   
Although all PASS processes are related to achievement, specific processes, such as 
planning, appear to be related to distinct aspects of academic performance, such as numerical 
concepts, number estimation and calculations (Das et al., 1994; Kroesbergen, Van Luit, & 
Naglieri (2003).  The underpinning theory behind this concept is that planning processes are used 
to make decisions to solve math problems, to monitor performance of problem-solving, to recall 
numerical information and math facts, and to evaluate answers (Naglieri & Das, 1997).  If 
executive processes of planning are known to be deficient in ADHD and this frontal component 
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is broadly linked to knowledge of numerical concepts, perhaps strategic interventions based on 
numeracies can be successfully used to compensate for deficits. 
Utility of PASS Theory as a Measure of Cognitive Abilities of Processing 
Researchers have also studied the utility of the PASS theory, as operationalized by the 
CAS, as a useful tool in assessment and identification of children with ADHD.  Naglieri et al. 
(2004) studied this possibility by investigating whether children with reported attention problems 
would evidence differences in CAS Planning Scales than typically developing children, and 
whether children with a reading disability would perform differently in successive processing 
abilities relative to those with a reading disability.  As expected, Naglieri et al. (2004) found that 
children referred for attention problems earned lower scores on CAS Planning Scales and 
children diagnosed with reading disabilities scored lower on CAS Successive Processing Scales, 
whereas typically developing children earned similarly average scores in both areas.  This 
finding suggests that Planning and Successive Processing Scales may hold some utility as part of 
a procedure for identification of ADHD and learning disabilities.  This is encouraging research, 
as children with cognitive weakness in any one of the postulated four PASS processes are more 
likely to experience academic problems as compared to children without PASS weaknesses 
(Naglieri et al., 2004); thus, this type of assessment and identification is critically needed.   
Strategy Training for Students with ADHD  
 ADHD is a disorder of inadequate response inhibition – a problem of performance, not 
skill; a problem of consistency, not ability (Goldstein & Naglieri, 2008).  Higher estimates 
occurring ostensibly from persistent and consistent strategy use by ADHD reasoners when 
resolving conflict with statistics appear similar to improvements seen in math intervention 
studies that focus on the planning component of the PASS theory.  These investigations have 
shown that students with ADHD and/or learning disabilities can be taught to better utilize their 
planning ability to be more strategic when completing math tasks, and that the facilitation of 
these tactics improves academic performance.  The research originated with studies by Cormier, 
Carlson, and Das (1990) and Kar, Dash, Das, and Carlson (1993), who exposed children to 
strategy use in analytic math reasoning and then followed up with discussions on strategy use in 
problem-solving.  Those children who performed poorly on measures of planning as per CAS 
testing methods were observed to have significantly greater gains than those with higher CAS 
planning scores.  That is to say, children with a planning weakness profited significantly more 
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from the strategy instruction than children without planning deficits.  Carraher, Carraher, and 
Schliemann (1985) found this same result when offering strategic training to middle school 
student with learning disabilities.  Students received both schema strategy training and problem-
solving training, leading to substantially increased base-line math scores, which in turn 
generalized to other novel math word problem-solving.  Further studies by Naglieri and Gottling 
(1995, 1997) reported similar conclusions in their study on strategy training for math problem-
solving in learning disabled students.  As with Carraher et al. (1985), these students showed 
markedly improved performance from base-line scores in analytic reasoning on math 
calculations after receiving comprehensive strategy training.  Naglieri and Johnson (2000) 
extended this work.  They reported that children with a cognitive weakness in planning improved 
considerably over base-line rates when strategies were taught, whereas those with no planning 
deficits improved only marginally in math performance with the same teaching intervention.  
More recently, Iseman and Naglieri (2011) compared regular instruction to strategy training for 
two groups diagnosed with ADHD.  Those who received the strategic instruction method 
consistently outperformed the regular instruction group on math worksheets.  This study, in 
particular, demonstrates that strategy training to support deficit planning processes may be 
beneficial to students with ADHD. 
Another study by Deaño, Alfonso, and Das (2015) strengthens the argument of strategy 
use.  Deaño and colleagues implemented a PASS Remedial Program (PREP) to examine 
potential improvement in children with special educational needs when strategies were aimed at 
specific cognitive processes underlying academic skills, such as arithmetic skills.  Children who 
received training in the program were assessed at pre- and post-intervention in the PASS 
cognitive processes.  They were also assessed for general levels of intelligence and arithmetic 
performance in calculus and math problem-solving.  The program emphasized the development 
of strategies, such as rehearsal, sequencing, categorization, relation, seriation, procedural 
problem-solving, and rapid number estimation.  Students were encouraged to become aware of 
strategy use through verbalization of their problem-solving approach.  In line with previous 
studies, differences in pre-and post-testing were significantly higher for children from the 
experimental group (special educational needs) with respect to planning processes, arithmetic 
skills, and math problem solving as compared to controls.  The rationale behind improvement 
when strategies are utilized for students with learning difficulties, in particular when learning 
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strategies for math word problems is thus: As students become more proficient at using 
strategies, they become adept at solving problems because they use more efficient memory-based 
strategies and become experts at numerical decoding and valuation (Geary, 2004).  As well, with 
increased practice in using strategies, it takes less time to execute each strategy.  The transition to 
a more automated style of processing that is memory-based results in faster solutions, a reduction 
in valuable resources of working memory, and fewer procedural errors.   
The conclusions of the current study regarding improved reasoning performance through 
persistent use of a strategy use align with research showing improvement though strategic 
instruction for students who have limited executive functions in areas of planning, as related to 
PASS theory.  Research literature  over the last ten years offers limited information relating to 
the efficacy of targeted interventions for students with ADHD, such as instruction on utilizing 
planning processes more efficiently, curbing impulsivity in decision-making, increasing 
reflection time in problem-solving, and ensuring appropriate application of strategies. 
Practical Implications 
ADHD is associated with chronic academic underachievement relative to the intellectual 
capabilities of those diagnosed, including low grades at school and low scores on standardized 
tests (Barkley, 2014; Bussing et al., 2012; Loe & Feldman, 2007; Schuck & Crinella, 2005) and 
a higher risk of adolescent school dropout (32%–38% vs.5%; Barkley, 2002, 2006; National 
Center for Educational Statistics [NCES], 2006).  Many individuals with ADHD either drop out 
or disengage in their schooling, keeping them away from many post-secondary options (Barkley, 
2014; Bussing et al., 2012; Loe & Feldman, 2007; Schuck & Crinella, 2005).  There is a critical 
need for collaboration between science, psychology, and education to inform teaching methods 
that engender a positive and rewarding learning experience for all students of diverse needs.  By 
integrating our knowledge of cognition and reasoning with what is known about the biological 
and neuropsychological underpinnings of ADHD, we can better design pedagogies centered on 
brain-based approaches to learning in order that students of diverse needs, including those with 
ADHD, can process the experiences in ways that augment the extraction of meaning.  The 
current study’s surprising results underscore how acknowledged executive impairments 
associated with ADHD can hinder the reasoning process for students diagnosed with this 
disorder.  The impact of impairments in a classroom setting, such as when writing a multiple 
exam, are numerous.  First, students with ADHD may find it more difficult than their non-
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ADHD peers to encode and retain wordy or protracted information; second, students with ADHD 
are likely to have more difficulty inhibiting the tempting but incorrect answers designed to catch 
students on multiple choice exams; and third; equal or better accuracy rates and similar levels of 
confidence between groups evidence that students with ADHD are quite capable of overcoming 
both inhibitory deficits and working memory shortfalls if given additional time to produce a 
response.  Moreover, if teachers are aware of the specific difficulties with inhibitory control and 
working memory shortfalls, they may use alternate means when teaching students with ADHD 
(e.g., information presented in bullet form, concise sentences, everyday language, clear-cut 
explicit statements, and content containing instantly recognizable meanings). 
Strategy Instruction.  Explicit systematic instruction has been identified as one of the 
strongest evidence-based approaches to instruction for students with learning disabilities and 
ADHD (Allsopp, Minskoff, & Bolt, 2005).  The possibility that university students with ADHD 
consistently and persistently applied a strategy for problem-solving to a greater extent than their 
non-ADHD counterparts underscores three points:  a) that individuals with ADHD are aware of 
their cognitive limitations; b) that individuals with ADHD are capable of learning and 
implementing strategies intended to assist them in problem-solving; and c) that there is a 
potential for over-reliance on these strategies.  Allsopp and colleagues report that students with 
ADHD and learning disabilities often have difficulty applying learning strategies on their own; 
however, when provided strategy instruction that is explicit and systematic, students can learn to 
apply strategies proficiently.  A unique individualized course-specific strategy instruction model 
was developed by Allsopp and colleagues to assist postsecondary students with learning 
disabilities and ADHD in their learning needs and increase success in meeting rigorous academic 
demands.  Allsopp et al.’s  model, which was tested over a three year period, included the 
following components: (a) informal assessment of a student’s individual learning needs, coupled 
with a learning strategy intervention (e.g., organization, test taking, study skills, note taking, 
reading, and writing); (b) targeted strategies that addressed the learning need as applied to 
specific course demands; (c) instruction of learning strategies using systematic explicit 
instruction within the context of a particular course; and (d) one-on-one strategy instruction 
tailored to the student’s learning needs.  The three-year project resulted in increased GPAs and 
increased academic performance for the majority of participants that was attributable, at least in 
part, to involvement in the strategy training project.  In particular, a subgroup of students on 
 60 
 
academic probation or suspension seemed to receive maximum benefit from the strategy 
training.  Moreover, participants sustained academic improvement one semester after strategy 
instruction ended. 
Accommodations for Extra Time.  Observed longer response latencies for participants 
with ADHD on both the CRT task and most conditions of base-rate task identify the necessity of 
extended time to complete tasks for students with ADHD.  Even with the implementation of a 
numerical strategy, the ADHD group required significantly longer latencies than controls to 
resolve base-rate conflict problems with statistics, likely to overcome inhibitory deficits 
associated with ADHD.  Response latencies for problems solved with beliefs, both for conflict 
and non-conflict problems, also required longer response latencies for the ADHD group, possibly 
due to reduced overall efficiency in terms of working memory, processing speed, and task 
fluency (Holmes et al., 2010; Lewandowski et al., 2007), resulting in significant difficulty to 
encode the lengthy descriptions.  Regardless of the underlying reason, the revealed longer 
latencies support the critical need for time accommodations for students with ADHD on school 
course work and exams.  Currently, most post-secondary schools offering disability support for 
students with ADHD provide accommodations of time of one-half for exams or assignments.  
The longer latencies demonstrated in the current study substantiate that this additional time may 
be vital to the academic success and progress of students with ADHD. 
Implications for Secondary School.  Future studies should be completed to determine if 
the current findings apply to younger ages and/or individuals with ADHD not enrolled in post-
secondary education.  The implications of these findings are extensive with respect to academic 
outcomes for younger students, such as those in high school.  The notion that individuals with 
ADHD may perform better when highly salient information is readily accessible might influence 
instruction, material presentation, or assignment rubrics for grades in secondary school. 
Education about the Cognitive Limitations of ADHD.  Many educators agree that the 
training they receive regarding interventions and strategies specific to instructing individuals 
with ADHD is inadequate (Martinussen, Tannock, & Chaban, 2011).  If educators were provided 
a better understanding of the cognitive processing limitations of ADHD, it may influence how 
they interact, guide, and teach individuals diagnosed with the disorder.  The findings of this 
study may provide a clearer understanding of why certain teaching tactics, such as explicit 
strategy instruction, are effective for students with ADHD (Meltzer & Montague, 2001) and why 
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additional time to complete work is a necessity for ADHD students.  Many classroom 
interventions for ADHD are geared toward behavioural modifications (e.g., grab their attention; 
make it relevant; do it together; try teams; take aim; keep it visual; talk out loud; build on what 
they know; modify assignment length; allow “wiggle cushions,” alternate high- and low-energy 
lessons, rearrange seating, Fulk, 2000).  Specific targeted instructional interventions, such as 
strategy training, may facilitate even more academic success for the ADHD student.  Teachers, 
parents, and the students themselves diagnosed with ADHD need to be educated about the 
executive inhibition deficits of ADHD in order to implement successful interventions and 
strategies designed to overcome deficits.   
Limitations 
Considering that inhibitory deficits were only manifested in response latencies, an 
obvious limitation may be that the base-rate and CRT task, both assumed to be a proxy measure 
of executive inhibition, may not have been ideal study tasks with which to examine inhibitory 
deficits in an ADHD population.  Future studies that utilize logic problems well-evidenced to 
measure inhibitory control, such as syllogisms, are warranted.  
Participants were asked to specify which college they were registered in (e.g., Arts & 
Science; Nursing; Engineering); however, in view of the surprising findings, a more specific 
taxonomy of participants’ majors would have been advantageous.  Frequency tables (see Table 
4) illustrate that the dominant college of enrollment for participants was Arts and Science; 
however, this broad categorization was unhelpful when making associations between academic 
majors that require a high proficiency with numbers (e.g., math, physics, chemistry) and cost-
efficient cognitive strategies for problem-solving with numerical strategies.  Recording the 
specific majors of each participant should be a consideration for future studies of this nature to 
correlate academic interest with reasoning performance.   
 It is quite possible that the participant pool of ADHD students have higher intellectual 
capacities than that of non-university students with ADHD, which could diminish the 
generalizability of the results.  IQ scores of university students differ greatly between majors, but 
as a whole, differences in IQ scores are positively correlated with academic achievement or 
levels of education (Barber, 2005; Deary, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Kaufman, Reynolds, Liu, 
Kaufman, & McGrew, 2012).  The education–intelligence correlation is likely reciprocal: 
schooling raises intelligence and intelligent people realize the advantages to be gained through 
 62 
 
higher education (Rindermann, 2008).  Just as with the general population, individuals diagnosed 
with ADHD who are afforded higher levels of intelligence often achieve success that is out of 
reach for those ADHD individuals with lower IQs (Loe & Feldman, 2007), and this advantage 
certainly applies to the opportunity for university studies.  Thus, reasoning performances by 
ADHD participants may not necessarily extend to the subset of ADHD individuals in the general 
population who do not attend university.   
It is also possible that the study’s sample university students with ADHD were able to 
practice and hone their reasoning skills early on in education, whereas students with ADHD who 
did not have the potential to attend university may not have had the capability to do strategic 
problem-solving while in secondary education.  Alternatively, given that education and complex 
tasks are known to raise levels of intelligence and knowledge (Rindermann, 2008), perhaps the 
additional years of university education provided ADHD students with more opportunities to 
enhance their strategy skills.  Taken one step further, we do not know the particular academic 
success of the ADHD participants.  Certainly the ADHD group’s latency scores indicate that 
individuals with ADHD are not as fast in academic reasoning as their counterparts, but this does 
not necessarily translate to lower grade point averages.  Sternberg (1998) proposes that 
performance on both tests of intelligence and academic achievement is mediated by developing 
expertise in meta-cognitive skills, learning skills, and thinking skills.  It is these developing 
thinking skills that this study speaks to.  Given the association between ADHD and executive 
functioning, perhaps potential university contenders diagnosed with ADHD may have found 
strategic ways to augment executive skills in numerical problem-solving, thereby increasing their 
meta-cognitive skills, learning skills, and thinking skills.  However, this does not necessarily 
translate to higher scores for intelligence. 
It also is possible that the severity of attention deficits in our ADHD group were less than 
that seen in the general population of persons diagnosed ADHD.  The extent of impairment 
would likely have implications for results, generalization, and future research. 
There is also the possibility that the controlled environment of the reasoning lab made for 
ideal conditions for individuals with ADHD to maintain focus and concentration, much more so 
than for control participants.  In ideal conditions that minimize the influence of inattentiveness 
(e.g., reduced distractions, high-interest stimuli), a student can solve complex problems at least 
as well—and usually better—than he or she performs on simple laboratory tests of executive 
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function (Schuck & Crinella, 2005).  While this advantage should have extended to all 
conditions, it is possible that laboratory effects were especially favorable to the ADHD group.  
Thus, it is not known if similar reasoning performance levels by individuals with ADHD could 
be attained in a typical classroom learning environment. 
Future Directions 
The chosen tasks for the current study’s experiment may not have sufficiently measured 
executive inhibition and its effect on high-level reasoning.  Future studies could examine this 
relationship using other forms of logic tasks that are perhaps more suitable for measurement of 
inhibitory control.  This could include syllogism tasks, the most commonly accepted form of 
logical reasoning, wherein reasoners must decouple logic from established truth to assess the 
validity of an argument.  Examples include: conditional syllogisms (e.g., If Johnny is eating 
sweets every day, he is placing himself at risk for diabetes. Johnny does not eat sweets every 
day.  Therefore Johnny is not placing himself at risk for diabetes.); disjunctive syllogisms (e.g., 
Either the meeting is at school or at home.  The meeting is not at home. Therefore the meeting is 
at school.); or categorical syllogisms (e.g., All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Socrates is 
mortal.).   
Future replication studies are necessary to confirm the hypothesis of strategy use by 
ADHD thinkers and their difficulty in processing lengthy expanses of information.  Hypothesis 
testing might include having participants reason on assorted logic/probability problems, a portion 
of which enable low-cost processing and others that demand heavy cognitive resources to 
separate logic from truth.  Specifically, problem-solving abilities can be contrasted between 
problems that feature salient numbers (e.g., base-rate problems and denominator neglect tasks) 
against syllogism tasks (e.g., categorical syllogism tasks and conjunction fallacy tasks).  If the 
strategy hypothesis is correct, ADHD reasoners should reveal better performance on the 
problems containing numerical information as compared to non-numerical tasks that demand 
more complex cognitive reasoning to separate belief from logic. 
One way to examine if ADHD reasoners have difficulty encoding lengthy descriptive 
information when asked to reason with beliefs is to replicate the current experiment using base-
rate problems that feature “bullet-points” as opposed to a “paragraph form” presentation of the 
descriptive information.  This format replicates an experiment done by Pennycook, Fugelsang, 
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and Koehler (2015) and may result in better performances for ADHD reasoners when solving 
problems under the belief instruction.   
Another question that could be addressed is to determine if younger age groups 
diagnosed with ADHD also utilize numerical strategies.  Comparative studies could be addressed 
through a two-stage process that examines both adults and adolescents with and without ADHD 
using the selected logic/probability tasks described above.   
An innovative method to shed further light on how ADHD students approach problem-
solving tasks is to track eye movements as participants work through logic/probability problems.  
Eye-tracking software follows eye movements to assess what detail of the problem reasoners are 
focusing on in decision-making, which would help to confirm if and when strategies are applied.  
As well, eye-tracking software would be beneficial to determine how quickly/slowly/carefully 
the ADHD reasoners are reading (and thus encoding) the descriptive information in all problem 
conditions.  Further measures that could be incorporated in future studies of this type would be 
the inclusion of standardized measures of IQ to compare individual differences of cognition as 
well as a thinking disposition questionnaire to reveal potential correlations between cognitive 
capacity and normative answers. 
Conclusions 
Accuracy rates for the experimental task of the CRT did not appear to manifest the 
omnipresent executive inhibition difficulties widely evidenced to be a core deficit in ADHD.  
One explanation may be that inhibitory deficits are manifested in longer response latencies 
observed for ADHD reasoners.  Thus, ADHD reasoners require additional time to successfully 
engage the inhibitory control, but given this time, they can perform as accurately as controls.   
A second similar finding was that the characteristic inhibitory deficits of ADHD 
reasoners were not evidenced in responses by ADHD reasoners when resolving conflict base-rate 
problems, as revealed by the ADHD group’s superior performance relative to controls.  
Moreover, against tenets of serial model processing, two-way interference was observed on 
conflict conditions for the base-rate problems.  This supports literature demonstrating that 
extreme base-rates (e.g., 997 vs. 3), such as used in this study, are accessible to Type 1 
processes.  Consistent with previous evidence (De Neys, 2007, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014; 
Pennycook & Thompson, 2012), it may be possible that Type 1 processes stream multiple 
outputs based on both intuitive probability and beliefs.  As with the CRT task, it is likely that 
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inhibitory deficits were manifested by the ADHD group as longer RTs relative to controls when 
solving conflict problems.  Thus, although base-rates appear to be accessible to Type 1 
processing (as evidenced by two-way interference in controls), Type 2 processing may still be 
required to resolve the conflict between base-rates and beliefs.  Thus, while the ADHD group 
was ultimately able to successfully inhibit the inappropriate response (as evidenced by accuracy 
rates), they required significantly longer latencies to do so. 
A third key conclusion was that, while both groups appear to have used a low-cost 
numerical strategy to solve problems with statistics, the ADHD reasoners appear to have relied 
more consistently and persistently on this strategy, likely to mitigate executive deficits.  This 
implies that the current study’s sample of ADHD students are (a) aware of cognitive deficits; (b) 
have discovered strategic methods to cope with these executive function constraints; and (c) 
depend heavily on these coping methods for problem-solving.   
Consistent with literature citing working memory and processing speed inefficiencies in 
ADHD (Au et al., 2014; Holmes et al., 2010; Lewandowski, et al., 2007; Martinussen et al., 
2005; Willcutt et al., 2012), the current study’s ADHD participants appeared to have 
considerable difficulty processing the prolix descriptions, as indicated by similar RTs observed 
for the ADHD group in all problems solved with beliefs, regardless of the congruency of the 
problem.  This has important implications for classroom instruction, as does the finding that, 
despite having comparable or better accuracy in problem-solving relative to controls, ADHD 
reasoners still required significantly longer latencies to solve problems in most conditions, 
observations that clearly support the need for accommodations of time extensions for academic 
work.   
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Table 1  
Classic Executive Function Tasks used in Neuropsychological and Cognitive Studies of ADHD5  
Task Description Description 
Matching Familiar 
Figures Test  
The Matching Familiar Figures Test is a classic cognitive test.  The 
child views a series of visual designs. On the page is a target design and 
a number of to-be-matched designs.  The task is to correctly match the 
target with its identical mate within the group of designs.  The designs 
are more difficult to identify as the task progresses, so that controls slow 
down to main accuracy on the later items.  Failure to slow down, 
combined with increased errors, is taken as failure of inhibitory control 
or “impulsivity.”  
Continuous 
Performance Test 
The Continuous Performance Test (CPT) has several varieties. Their 
common element concerns the ability to respond to a rare target over a 
period of extended time (15 min or longer). For example, the computer 
might show a different letter every 2 sec; however, when an “X” 
appears that was preceded by an “A” the child is to press the response 
button. The target will appear only on 25% or less of trials. Successful 
detection of a rare target amid many nontargets is an index of vigilance. 
Signal detection theory can be used to compute a parameter called d-
prime (D =), which combines hits and misses to calculate sensitivity to 
the signal. One can also look at the relative weighing of commissions 
and omissions and calculate a parameter called beta, which signifies the 
response bias (e.g., tends to overrespond or underrespond). 
Basic Go/No-Go The inverse of a CPT, one must withhold response on rare “no-go” 
trials. Randomly alternating stimuli are presented (e.g., an “A” and a 
“B,” or two different visual designs).  The child is instructed to make a 
response when he or she sees the “A” but not when he or she sees the 
“B.”  The “A” is presented more often to create a response set or 
prepotency toward responding.  Errors in response to the “B” are taken 
as an index of failed inhibitory control.   
Event Rate Go/No-Go In the “event rate” version of this task, the rate at which stimuli are 
presented is varied (e.g., every 1 sec, every 4 sec, and every 8 sec). The 
faster even rates are more “activating” for the child up to an optimum, 
then become too fast and lead to performance decline. Thus, in general, 
a child with ADHD is expected to approach normal performance more 
closely at the faster event rates. 
Motivated Go/No-Go The task is similar to the basic go/no-go listed above, except that more 
stimuli are used (e.g., several numbers), some of which are paired with a 
reward (if you press the key when you see the “A,” you win 25 cents, 
and some with a response cost or punishment (if you press the key when 
you see a “B,” you lose 25 cents.  Various configurations of rewards or 
punishments are possible. 
                                                 
5  Adapted from Nigg, 2001, 2005 
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Task Description Description 
Stop Task Presents equally probable stimuli (e.g., an “X” and an “O”) with the 
instruction to press a corresponding key as quickly as possible, 
depending on which letter appears, creating a prepotent tendency to 
respond on most trials. On a minority of trials (25% typically), a signal 
(e.g., a tone) indicates that the child is not to respond. Timing of the 
tone is varied to estimate the speed of the “inhibition process” 
(essentially, how much warning does the child need to interrupt the 
response, which is mathematically independent of the speed of the 
response output process). Physiologic data indicate that a central 
(cognitive) process and a peripheral motor process are involved; 
responses can be interrupted even after peripheral nerves (on arm and 
hand muscles) have begun to fire. To measure inhibitory ability, older 
versions of the task calculated stop signal reaction time (SSRT) slope 
(degree of success drop-off at preset warning intervals). Newer versions 
use a dynamic tracking algorithm to directly estimate SSRT or warning 
time needed. The “go” trials of the task provide a strong measure of 
rapid decision-response time, and the variability of those response times 
is an index of response variability. 
Stroop Task This classic task has two or three conditions, depending on the design. 
The usual control condition is to name aloud as fast as possible the ink 
color of rows of x’s (e.g., xxxx printed in red, green, and blue ink). 
Speed on this task is compared with speed on the interference task. In 
the latter, the child must name as fast as possible the ink color of a 
sequence of words, each of which is a color word different from the 
color of the ink (e.g., the word “red” printed in blue ink, the word 
“blue” printed in green ink). Because reading the word is a faster, more 
automatic process than naming the color, normal children and adults are 
slower to name the colors in the interference condition; the extent of this 
slowing versus the control condition is taken as an index of the 
effectiveness of an interference suppression mechanism. A range of 
related stimulus incompatibility tasks tap interference control without 
requiring reading. Directed Forgetting This task is widely used in 
cognitive psychology but as yet little investigated with ADHD. The 
child views a sequence of easily named pictures and is then told to 
forget that list. They then view a second list, which they are told to 
remember. Recall of words to be remembered and words to be forgotten 
is then examined, across varying mixes of these conditions. In general, 
failure to recall a normal number of “remember” words or excess recall 
of “forget” words is taken as inhibitor failure. 
Emotional Stroop Similar to the Stroop, except that instead of color words, emotionally 
evocative words, such as words associated with anxiety or with fears, 
are printed in colored ink and must be named.  Anxious participants are 
slowed down more by anxiety-associated words than by neutral words, 
interpreted as difficulty suppressing the association to those words. 
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Task Description Description 
Flanker 
Task
  
A type of selective attention task that can be designed to require 
perceptual or cognitive suppression of competing information. Similar 
to Stroop, except information is spatially distinct. For example, the child 
would view a target area in the center of a computer screen, with an 
instruction to press the corresponding key depending on whether the 
“X” or “N” appears in the center. Immediately adjacent to the center 
letter are two “flanking” distractor letters that are to be ignored. The 
flankers can be incompatible (X or N) or neutral (e.g., F or D). It takes 
longer to respond to XNX than to FNF because in the first instance the 
flanker is a possible response that must be suppressed. 
Iowa Gambling Task The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is a test originally meant to measure 
decision making specifically within individuals who have ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex damage.  The concept of impulsivity as relates to the 
IGT is one in which impulsive decisions are a function of an individual's 
lack of ability to make rational decisions over time due to an over 
amplification of emotional/somatic reward.  In the IGT individuals are 
provided four decks of cards to choose from. Two of these decks 
provide much higher rewards but the deductions are also much higher 
while the second two decks have lower rewards per card but also much 
lower deductions. Over time anyone who chooses predominantly from 
the high rewards decks will lose money while those who choose from 
the smaller rewards decks will gain money. 
Card playing/door 
opening 
Each card played either wins or loses money.  Early in the “game,” most 
cards win money, creating a reward-based response set to keep playing.  
As the game progresses, the probability that the cards will lose money 
increases.  Normal respondents at some point realize this and stop 
playing before they have lost all the “winnings.”  Impulsive participants 
play longer and lose more money.  This is thought to demonstrate 
failure to suppress the reward-based response set when punishments 
appear.  The door opening task is the same, except doors and opened 
instead of playing cards; thus, it is more appropriate for younger 
children. 
Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test 
The Wisconsin Card Sort is a classic “executive function” measure. The 
child must match a series of cards to a target card; cards include varying 
numbers of shapes, varying shapes, and varying colors. Thus, the child 
must decide whether to sort by color, by number, or by shape. After 10 
consecutive correct matches, the sorting rule changes, but the child is 
not told of the change. Thus, they must notice that the old rule is no 
longer working, determine the new rule, and again this continues for 10 
correct matches, up to a total of six categories (in the full-length version 
of the test). The test requires working memory, abstraction, and set 
shifting abilities and activates prefrontal cortex. 
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Task Description Description 
Tower Task Several tower tasks exist, including the Tower of London, the Tower of 
Hanoi, the Stockings of Cambridge, and others. The idea in all of them 
is that discs or balls must be moved around on pegs (either manually or 
on a computer screen) according to certain rules, to arrive at a 
predetermined arrangement. The task required visualizing the moves in 
advance and can be designed to place heavy loads on visual working 
memory and sequencing. 
Directed Forgetting This task is widely used in cognitive psychology but as yet little 
investigated with ADHD. The child views a sequence of easily named 
pictures and is then told to forget that list. They then view a second list, 
which they are told to remember. Recall of words to be remembered and 
words to be forgotten is then examined, across varying mixes of these 
conditions. In general, failure to recall a normal number of “remember” 
words or excess recall of “forget” words is taken as inhibitory failure. 
Negative Priming An important variant of selective attention measures, this task has 
several versions, all of which exploit the principle that when two stimuli 
appear that differ on the task-relevant property (e.g., presented with a 
red car and a blue house, name the red object), the unchosen object 
property tends to act as though it has been suppressed, in that on the 
next trial it would take longer to name the red house, because the house 
had been suppressed on the prior trial, versus if the prior trial had not 
included a house. Failure to show this normal delay to name the 
previously “cued-wrong” object is taken by some as evidence of failure 
in an attentional inhibitory process. 
Prepulse Eyeblink An automatic startle eye blink response evoked by a loud noise is 
partially suppressed if the startling event (e.g., the loud noise) is 
preceded by another stimulus.  The degree of this suppression is the 
inhibitory index.  The effect is automatic and is thought to be related to 
brainstem and subcortical functioning involving dopaminergic neural 
systems. 
Attentional Orienting/ 
Spatial Orienting 
In this task, the child fixes his or her eyes on the centre of the computer 
screen, with an instruction to press the key as quickly as possible when 
he or she sees the target appear in either the left or the right periphery.  
The target is preceded by a warning cue that is either correct or incorrect 
in its spatial (left or right) visual field location.  The degree to which 
reaction time to the target is slowed down by the incorrect warning cue 
is sometimes interpreted as an index of inhibitory control, although that 
reaction time slowing could also be due to failure of several possible 
attentional mechanisms other than inhibition.  To avoid this, the task 
can, in principle, be designed to tap three kinds of inhibition, according 
to Rafal and Henik (1994); (a) inhibition of orienting to unattended 
locations (automatic), (b) inhibition of reflexive orienting in the service 
of a goal (controlled-effortful), and (c) inhibition of return (automatic).  
Most studies of ADHD were not designed to isolate the three basic 
inhibition functions, but rather to examine attentional orienting.  
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Task Description Description 
Oculomotor Inhibition 
of Return 
This is a variant of the orienting task, but includes eye movement 
monitoring.  Eye movements are observed while the person views the 
centre of the computer screen.  Sudden onsets of objects appear in 
various parts of the screen, creating a reflex response to move the eyes 
toward the object.  In normal adults, the eyes are slower to return to a 
location that was recently visited than to a novel location.  Failure to 
show this normal slower response to a previously viewed location is 
taken as a failure of this automatic inhibition process.  Because 
attention is known to move prior to the eyes (at a millisecond level), 
reaction time calculations are thought to enable a distinction between 
attentional and oculomotor inhibition of return.   
Antisaccade Oculomotor task in which eye movements are monitored. On each 
trial, a signal appears in the visual periphery, creating a reflex 
response to move the eyes toward that signal. The reflex is difficult to 
resist. On some blocks of trials, children are told not to move their 
eyes toward the signal. Instead, they might be instructed to delay their 
response or to move their eyes away from the signal. Errors toward 
the signal, as well as presignal anticipations, are taken as indices of 
inhibitory ability or ability to suppress motor response. 
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Table 2 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 6 
A. A persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with 
functioning or development, as characterized by (1) and/or (2) 
1. Inattention: Six (or more) of the following symptoms have persisted for at least six 
months to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level and that negatively 
impacts directly on social and academic/occupational activities: 
Note:  The symptoms are not solely a manifestation of oppositional behaviour, defiance, 
hostility, or failure to understand tasks or instructions.  For older adolescents and adults 
(age 17 and older), at least five symptoms are required. 
a. Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in schoolwork, 
at work, or during other activities (e.g. overlooks or misses details, work is 
inaccurate). 
b. Often has difficulties sustaining attention in tasks or play activities (e.g., has 
difficulty remaining focused during lectures, conversations, or lengthy reading). 
c. Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly (e.g., mind seems elsewhere, 
even in the absence of any obvious distraction). 
d. Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork, chores, 
or duties in the workplace (e.g., starts tasks but quickly loses focus and is easily 
sidetracked).  
e. Often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities (e.g., difficulty managing 
sequential tasks; difficulty keeping materials and belongings in order; messy, 
disorganized work; has poor time management; fails to meet deadlines). 
f. Often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental 
effort (e.g., schoolwork or homework; for older adolescents and adults, preparing 
reports, completing forms, reviewing lengthy papers).  
                                                 
6 Reprinted with permission from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition, (Copyright 2013, pp. 59–60). American Psychiatric Association. 
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g. Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g., school materials, pencils, 
books, tools, wallets, keys, paperwork, eyeglasses, mobile telephones). 
h. Is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli (for older adolescents and adults, may 
include unrelated thoughts). 
i. Is often forgetful in daily activities (e.g., doing chores, running errands; for older 
adolescents and adults, returning calls, paying bills, keeping appointments). 
2. Hyperactivity and Impulsivity: Six (or more) of the following symptoms have 
persisted for at least six months to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level 
and that negatively impacts directly on social and academic/occupational activities:   
Note:  The symptoms are not solely a manifestation of oppositional behaviour, defiance, 
hostility, or a failure to understand tasks or instructions.  For older adolescence and adults 
(age 17 and older), at least five symptoms are required.   
a. Often fidgets with or taps hands or feet or squirms in seat. 
b. Often leaves seat in situations when remaining seated is expected (e.g., leaves his or 
her place in the classroom, in the office or other workplace, or in other situations that 
require remaining in place).   
c. Often runs about or climbs in situations where it is inappropriate (Note: in 
adolescents or adults, may be limited to feeling restless). 
d. Often unable to play or engage in leisure activities quietly. 
e. Is often “on the go,” acting as if “driven by a motor” (e.g., is unable to be or 
uncomfortable being still for extended time, as in restaurants, meetings; may be 
experienced by others as being restless or difficult to keep up with).  
f. Often talks excessively. 
g. Often blurts out answers before a question has been completed (e.g., completes 
people’s sentences; cannot wait for turn in conversation). 
h. Often has difficulty waiting his or her turn (e.g., while waiting in line). 
i. Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into conversations, games, or 
activities; may start using other people’s things without asking or receiving  
permission; for adolescents and adults, may intrude into or take over what others are 
doing. 
A. Several inattentive or hyperactive-impulsive symptoms were present prior to age 12 years. 
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B. Several inattentive or hyperactive-impulsive symptoms are present in two or more settings 
(e.g., at home, school, or work; with friends or relatives; in other activities). 
C. There is clear evidence that the symptoms interfere with, or reduce the quality of, social, 
academic, or occupational functioning. 
D. The symptoms do not occur exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or another 
psychotic disorder and are not better explained by another mental disorder (e.g., mood 
disorder, anxiety disorder, dissociative disorder, personality disorder, substance intoxication 
or withdrawal). 
Specify whether: 
Combined presentation:  If both Criterion A1 (inattention) and Criterion A2 (hyperactivity-
impulsivity) are met for the past six months. 
Predominantly inattentive presentation:  If Criterion A1 (inattention) is met but Criterion 
A2 (hyperactivity-impulsivity) is not met for the past six months. 
Predominantly hyperactive/impulsive presentation:  If Criterion A2 (hyperactivity-
impulsivity) is met and Criterion A1 (inattention) is not met for the past six months. 
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Table 3 
Demographical Information of Participants 
 Males   Females Total 
Non-ADHD (Controls) 21 43 64 
Age Range 19-53 years 19-59 years  
Age:  Mean 26.3 years  
(SD = 7.23) 
29.23 years 
(SD = 10.3) 
 
Age:  Median 25 years 25 years  
Age:  Mode 20 years  21 years  
Years of Study:  Mean 4.1 years  
(SD = 2.68) 
4.1 year  
(SD = 2.35) 
 
Years of Study:  Median 4 years 4 years  
Years of Study:  Mode 1 year 4 years  
College of Study: Mode Arts and Science Arts and Science  
Test Anxiety 1 0  
Learning Disability 0 0  
    
ADHD 23 41 64 
Age Range 18-54 years 20-58  
Age:  Mean 27.3 years  
(SD =9.3) 
31.15 years 
(SD = 11.07) 
 
Age:  Median 24 years 27 years  
Age:  Mode 19 years  
20 years 
25 years 
20 years  
Years of Study:  Mean 4.13 years  
(SD = 4.21) 
4.16 years 
(SD = 2.43) 
 
Years of Study:  Median 3 years 4 years  
Years of Study:  Mode 1 year  
3 years  
4 years 
2 years  
College of Study: Mode** Arts and Science Arts and Science  
Test Anxiety 1 10  
Learning Disability 0 0  
Total 44 84 128 
**see detailed list of College of Study next table 
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Table 4 
Detailed List of College of Study by Participants 
Control 
Group 
Arts and Science 28 
ADHD 
Group 
Arts and Science 27 
Education 2 Education 2 
Business 5 Business 4 
Engineering 5 Engineering 7 
Nursing 1 Nursing 7 
Kinesiology 3 Medicine 2 
Graduate Studies & Research 15 Social Work 2 
Agriculture 3 Kinesiology 1 
Other  2 Pharmacy and Nutrition 1 
  Graduate Studies & Research 3 
  Law 2 
  Veterinary Medicine 2 
  Other 4 
Total 
              
64 
Total 
      
64 
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Table 5 
 
Duration of Effects of Commonly Used ADHD Medications7 
 
DRUG FORM DURATION OF EFFECTS  
METHYLPHENIDATE 
RITALIN  
METHYLIN 
METADATE 
Generic MPH  
Short 
Acting 
Tablet  
5 mg  
10 mg  
20 mg  
About 3-4 hours. Most helpful when need rapid 
onset and short duration. 
FOCALIN 
(with isolated dextroisomer)  
Short 
Acting 
Tablet  
2.5 mg  
5 mg  
10 mg 
About 3-4 hours. Most helpful when need rapid 
onset and short duration. Only formulation with 
isolated dextro-isomer. 
RITALIN SR 
 
 
________________ 
METHYLIN ER 
________________ 
METADATE ER 
Mid Acting 
Tablet  
20mg 
_______ 
Mid Acting 
Tablet  
10 mg 
20mg  
Onset delayed for 60-90 minutes. Duration 
supposed to be 6-8 hours, but can be quite 
individual and unreliable.  
RITALIN LA 
50% immediate release beads 
and 50% delayed release beads  
 
 
_____________ 
 
METADATE CD 
30% immediate release and 
70% delayed release beads 
Mid Acting 
Capsule  
20 mg  
30 mg  
40 mg  
_____ 
Mid Acting 
Capsule  
10 mg  
20 mg  
30 mg  
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration about 8 hours.  
CONCERTA 
 
22% immediate release 
and 78% gradual release  
Long 
Acting 
Tablet  
18 mg  
27 mg  
36 mg  
54 mg  
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration about 10-14 
hours.  
                                                 
7 Adapted from Johnson & Parker, 2004 
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Duration of Effects of Commonly Used ADHD Medications, continued 
 
DRUG FORM DURATION OF EFFECTS  
DEXTROAMPHETAMINE 
DEXTROSTAT 
 
 
 
 
________________ 
 
DEXEDRINE 
*2004 PDR does not list short 
acting Dexedrine tablets  
Short Acting 
Tablet  
5 mg  
10 mg  
_____ 
 
Short Acting 
Tablet  
5 mg 
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration 
about 4-5 hours. 
DEXEDRINE SPANSULE 
 
 
________________ 
 
dextroamphetamine sulfate ER  
Long Acting 
Spansule  
5 mg  
10 mg  
15 mg 
_____ 
 
5mg 
10 mg 
15 mg  
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration 
about 5-10 hours. 
MIXED AMPHETAMINE  FORM DURATION OF EFFECTS  
ADDERALL  Short Acting 
Tablet  
5 mg 
7.5 mg  
10 mg 
12.5 mg 
15 mg  
20 mg 
30 mg  
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration 
about 4-5 hours.  
ADDERALL XR 
50% immediate release beads 
and 50% delayed release beads  
Long Acting 
Capsule  
5 mg  
10 mg  
15 mg  
20 mg  
25 mg  
30 mg 
Onset in 60-90 minutes (possibly 
sooner). Duration 10-12 hours. 
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Duration of Effects of Commonly Used ADHD Medications, continued 
 
DRUG FORM DURATION OF EFFECTS  
ATOMOXETINE   
STRATTERA Long Acting 
Capsule  
10 mg  
18 mg  
25 mg  
40 mg  
60 mg 
Starts working within a few days to 
one week, but full effect may not be 
evident for a month or more. 
Duration 10-12 hours as long as 
taken daily as directed. 
BUPROPRION FORM  DURATION OF EFFECTS  
WELLBUTRIN IR  Short Acting 
Tablet  
IR-75 mg  
100 mg 
About 4-6 hours. 
WELLBUTRIN SR 
  
Long Acting 
Tablet  
SR-100 mg 
150mg  
200 mg  
About 10-14 hours.  
ALPHA-2 AGONISTS  FORM DURATION OF EFFECTS  
CATAPRES  
(clonidine) 
 
 
------------------------------ 
CLONIDINE  
Tablet  
0.1 mg  
0.2 mg  
0.3 mg 
-------- 
Tablet  
0.1 mg  
0.2 mg  
0.3 mg 
Onset in 30-60 minutes. Duration 
about 3 - 6 hours. 
CATAPRES Patch TTS-1  
TTS-2  
TTS-3 
Duration 4-5 days, so avoids the 
vacillations in drug effect seen in 
tablets.  
TENEX  
(guanfacine)  
 
 
----------------------- 
guanfacine tablets  
1 mg  
2 mg  
3 mg  
-------- 
1 mg  
2 mg  
3 mg  
Duration about 6 - 12 hours. 
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Table 6 
Mean Probability Estimates for Congruency x Instruction x Group (% accuracy) 
 
Group 
 
Statistics Beliefs Totals 
 N 64 64 64 
Control Conflict 64.68 60.78 62.73 
SD 28.92 23.35 14.34 
SE 3.62 2.96 1.79 
N 62 63 61 
Non-Conflict 87.17 82.20 84.81 
SD 10.75 13.69 9.56 
SE 1.37 1.73 1.22 
N 62 63 61 
Mean Totals 76.02 71.40 73.63 
SD 16.44 12.48 9.54 
SE 2.09 1.57 1.22 
 N 64 64 64 
ADHD Conflict 78.93 59.13 69.03 
SD 24.34 25.83 15.42 
SE 3.04 3.23 1.93 
N 63 63 62 
Non-Conflict 90.68 85.65 88.41 
SD 12.24 12.93 10.44 
SE 1.54 1.63 1.33 
N 63 63 62 
Mean Total 84.97 72.49 79.11 
SD 16.43 13.03 10.04 
SE 2.07 1.64 1.28 
 
Group x Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,121) = 3.54, MSE = 536.04, p = .062, ηp2= .028 
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Table 7 
 
Mean Probability Estimates for Instruction x Group (% accuracy) 
 
 Group Statistics   Beliefs Total  
  N 62 63 61 
  Mean 76.02 71.40 73.63 
 Control SD 16.44 12.48 9.54 
  SE 2.09 1.57 1.22 
  N 63 63 62 
Instruction   Mean 84.97 72.49 79.11 
x Group ADHD SD 16.43 13.03 10.04 
  SE 2.07 1.642 1.275 
  N 125 126 123 
  Mean 80.53 71.94 76.39 
 Total SD 16.97 12.72 10.13 
  SE 1.52 1.13 .91 
 
Instruction x Group 
F(1,121)= 4.34, MSE = 475.83, p =.039, ηp2 = .035 
 
 
  
 102 
 
Table 8 
Mean Probability Estimates for Congruency x Group (% accuracy) 
 Group Conflict Non Conflict Total 
  N 64 61 61 
  Mean 62.73 84.81 73.63 
 Control SD 14.34 9.56 9.54 
Congruency  SE 1.79 1.22 1.22 
x Group  N 64 62 62 
  Mean 69.03 88.41 79.11 
 ADHD SD 15.42 10.44 10.04 
  SE 1.93 1.33 1.28 
  N 128 123 123 
  Mean 65.88 86.63 76.39 
 Total SD 15.16 10.14 10.13 
  SE 1.34 .91 .91 
 
Congruency x Group 
F(1,121) = 1.70, MSE = 255.20, p = .195, ηp2= .014 
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Table 9 
Mean Probability Estimates for Congruency x Instruction (% accuracy) 
  Statistics Beliefs Totals  
 N 128 128 128 
 Conflict 71.81 59.96 65.88 
 SD 27.57 24.54 15.163 
 SE 2.44 2.17 1.34 
 N 125 126 123 
Congruency Non-Conflict 88.94 83.93 86.63 
x Instruction SD 11.61 13.37 10.135 
 SE 1.04 1.19   .914 
 N 125 126 123 
 Mean Totals 80.53 71.94 76.39 
 SD 16.974 12.719 10.13 
 SE  1.518 1.133 .91 
 
Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,121) = 2.97, MSE = 536.04, p = .087, ηp2= .024 
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Table 10 
 
Mean Response Times (RTs) for Congruency x Instruction x Group (ms) 
 
Group 
 
Statistic Belief Totals 
 N 60 64 60 
Control Conflict 15825.77 19455.88 17217.15 
SD 6714.81 10358.19 7246.88 
SE 866.88 1294.77 935.57 
N 62 63 62 
Non-Conflict 15331.02 16016.84 15612.94 
SD 7162.60 7488.01 6634.81 
SE 909.65 943.40 842.62 
N 59 63 59 
Mean Totals 15327.78 17514.64 16117.54 
SD 6224.30 7921.32 6405.56 
SE 810.34 997.99 833.933 
 N 61 64 61 
ADHD Conflict 18399.95 22014.06 19771.38 
SD 6211.87 9907.34 6491.92 
SE 795.35 1238.42 831.20 
N 60 62 58 
Non-Conflict 15360.94 20400.91 17392.92 
SD 5174.63 9116.25 6035.90 
SE 662.69 1157.76 792.55 
N 58 62 57 
Mean Totals 16512.69 20962.09 18278.52 
SD 4749.60 8884.72 5838.49 
SE 623.65 1128.36 773.33 
 
Group x Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,114) = 7.20, MSE = 15747438.89, p = .008, ηp2= .059 
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Table 11 
Mean Response Times (RTs) for Instruction x Group (ms) 
 
  Statistics Beliefs Totals 
 N 59 63 59 
Instruction x 
Group 
Control 15327.78 17514.64 16117.54 
SD 6224.30 7921.32 6405.56 
SE 810.24 997.99 833.93 
N 58 62 57 
ADHD 16512.69 20962.09 18278.52 
SD 4749.60 8884.72 5838.49 
SE 623.65 1128.36 773.33 
N 117  125 116 
Mean Totals 15915.17 19224.58 17179.40 
SD 5550.66 8555.77 6202.47 
SE 513.16 765.25 575.89 
 
Instruction x Group 
F(1,114) = 2.51, MSE = 45600276.08, p = .116, ηp2= .022 
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Table 12 
Mean Response Times (RTs) for Congruency x Group (ms) 
 
 Group Conflict Non-Conflict Total 
  N 60 62 59 
  Mean 17217.15 15612.94 16117.54 
 Control SD 7246.88 6634.81 6405.56 
  SE 935.57 842.62 833.93 
Congruency  N 61 58 57 
x Group  Mean 19771.38 17392.92 18278.52 
 ADHD SD 6491.92 6035.90 5838.49 
  SE 831.20 792.55 773.33 
  N 121 120 116 
  Mean 18504.82 16473.26 17179.40 
 Total SD 6966.92 6388.57 6202.48 
  SE 633.36 583.19 575.89 
 
Congruency x Group 
F(1,114) = .030, MSE = 21033843.88, p = .863, ηp2 < .001 
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Table 13 
 
Mean Response Times (RTs) for Congruency x Instruction (ms) 
 
   Statistics Beliefs Totals  
 
 N 121 128 121 
 
 Mean 17123.49 20734.97 18504.82 
 
Conflict SD 6567.41 10176.31 6966.92 
 
 SE 597.05 899.50 633.36 
Congruency   N 122 125 120 
x Instruction  Mean 15345.74 18191.34 16473.26 
 
Non-Conflict SD 6238.59 8588.44 6388.57 
 
 SE 564.82 768.17 583.19 
 
 N 117 125 116 
 
 Mean 15915.95 19224.58 17179.40 
 
Total SD 5550.66 8555.70 6202.47 
 
   SE 513.16 765.25 575.89 
 
Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,114) = .104, MSE = 15747438.89, p = .748, ηp2 = .001 
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Table 14 
Mean Confidence Ratings Congruency x Instruction x Group (1 – low; 9 – high) 
Group 
 
Statistic Belief Totals 
 N 63 64 63 
Control  
Conflict 7.41 7.23 7.31 
SD 1.26 1.03 .95 
SE .16 .13 .12 
N 64 64 64 
Non-Conflict 7.78 7.64 7.71 
SD .98 .928 .82 
SE .12 .12 .10 
N 63 64 63 
Mean Totals 7.59 7.43 7.51 
SD 1.03 .89 .82 
SE .13 .11 .10 
 N 63 63 62 
ADHD 
Conflict 7.31 6.90 7.09 
SD 1.32 1.07 1.03 
SE .17 .14 .13 
N 64 63 63 
Non-Conflict 7.69 7.40 7.53 
SD 1.14 1.06 .96 
SE .14 .13 .12 
N 63 63 62 
Mean Totals 7.51 7.15 7.31 
SD 1.16 1.00 .97 
SE .15 .13 .12 
 
Group x Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,123) =.089, MSE = .315, p = .765, ηp2= .001 
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Table 15 
Mean Confidence Ratings Instruction x Group (1 – low; 9 – high) 
 Group Statistics Belief Total 
  N 63 64 63 
  Mean 7.59 7.43 7.51 
 Control SD 1.03 .89 .82 
  SE .13 .11 .10 
Instruction   N 63 63 62 
x Group  Mean 7.51 7.15 7.31 
 ADHD SD 1.17 1.00 .97 
  SE .15 .13 .12 
  N 126 127 125 
  Mean 7.55 7.29 7.41 
 Total SD 1.10 .96 .90 
  SE .10 .09 .08 
 
Instruction x Group 
F(1,123) = 1.15, MSE = .993, p = .286, ηp2= .009 
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Table 16 
Mean Confidence Ratings Congruency x Group (1 – low to 9 – high) 
 Group Conflict Non-Conflict Total 
 Control N 63 64 63 
  Mean 7.31 7.71 7.51 
  SD .95 .82 .82 
  SE .12 .10 .10 
Congruency ADHD N 62 63 62 
x Group  Mean 7.09 7.53 7.31 
  SD 1.03 .96 .97 
  SE .13 .12 .12 
 Total N 125 127 125 
  Mean 7.20 7.62 7.41 
  SD 1.00 .89 .90 
  SE .09 .08 .08 
 
Congruency x Group 
F(1,123) = .288, MSE = .356, p = .592, ηp2= .002 
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Table 17 
Mean Confidence Ratings Congruency x Instruction (1 – low; 9 – high) 
  Statistics Beliefs Totals 
 N 126 127 125 
Congruency x 
Instruction 
Conflict 7.36 7.07 7.20 
SD 1.29 1.06 1.00 
SE .11 .09 .09 
N 128 127 127 
Non-Conflict 7.73 7.52 7.62 
SD 1.06 1.00 .90 
SE .09 .09 .08 
N 126 127 125 
Mean Totals  7.55 7.29 7.41 
SD 1.10 .96 .90 
SE .98  .85 .08 
 
Congruency x Instruction 
F(1,123) = .683, MSE = .315, p = .410, ηp2= .006 
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Table 18 
Mean CRT Percent Correct for Groups  
 Group N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
CRT  
Percent 
Correct 
Control 64 34.86 36.87 4.61 
ADHD 64 46.34 34.53 4.32 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Error of 
Mean 
df t value Significance 
p = .919 -11.48 6.31 126 1.82 p =. 071 
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Table 19  
Mean CRT Response Times for Groups (ms) 
 Group N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
CRT  RT 
Control 59 36626.88 22016.73 2818.95 
ADHD 61 46210.33 24920.33 3190.72 
 
Mean difference in CRT Response Times between Groups (ms) 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 Standard 
Error of 
Mean 
df t value Significance 
p = .016 -9583.45 4257.60 120 2.25 p =. 026 
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Table 20 
CRT Pearson Correlations 
 Group CRT RT CRT Percent 
Correct 
Statistical 
Estimates 
Belief 
Estimates 
Group 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .201* .160 .265** .043 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .026 .071 .003 .631 
N 128 122 128 125 126 
CRT RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.201* 1 -.063 -.114 .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .026  .489 .219 .716 
N 122 122 122 119 120 
CRT Percent 
Correct 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.160 -.063 1 .374** .023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .489  .000 .797 
N 128 122 128 125 126 
Statistical 
Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.265** -.114 .374** 1 -.090 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .219 .000  .321 
N 125 119 125 125 123 
Belief Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.043 .034 .023 -.090 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .631 .716 .797 .321  
N 126 120 126 123 126 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 21 
CRT Pearson Correlations by Group 
Correlations 
Group CRT RT  CRT Percent 
Correct 
Statistical 
Estimates 
Belief  
Estimates 
Statistical 
RT  
Belief  
RT  
Control 
CRT RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.245 -.153 .027 .386** .251 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .057 .247 .839 .003 .053 
N 61 61 59 60 56 60 
CRT Percent Correct 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.245 1 .374** -.006 -.071 .129 
Sig. (2-tailed) .057  .003 .962 .593 .315 
N 61 64 62 63 59 63 
Statistical Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.153 .374** 1 -.170 -.050 .249 
Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .003  .191 .709 .053 
N 59 62 62 61 57 61 
Belief  
Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.027 -.006 -.170 1 .011 -.103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .839 .962 .191  .933 .426 
N 60 63 61 63 58 62 
Statistical RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.386** -.071 -.050 .011 1 .670** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .593 .709 .933  .000 
N 56 59 57 58 59 59 
Belief RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.251 .129 .249 -.103 .670** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .315 .053 .426 .000  
N 60 63 61 62 59 63 
ADHD 
CRT RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .034 -.182 .033 .066 -.048 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .795 .163 .804 .629 .715 
N 61 61 60 60 56 59 
CRT Percent Correct 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.034 1 .331** .039 -.201 .018 
Sig. (2-tailed) .795  .008 .759 .130 .887 
N 61 64 63 63 58 62 
Statistical Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.182 .331** 1 -.052 -.221 .160 
Sig. (2-tailed) .163 .008  .691 .099 .219 
N 60 63 63 62 57 61 
Belief  
Estimates 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.033 .039 -.052 1 -.026 -.210 
Sig. (2-tailed) .804 .759 .691  .847 .104 
N 60 63 62 63 57 61 
Statistical  
Instruction RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.066 -.201 -.221 -.026 1 .481** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .629 .130 .099 .847  .000 
N 56 58 57 57 58 57 
Belief Instruction RT 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.048 .018 .160 -.210 .481** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .715 .887 .219 .104 .000  
N 59 62 61 61 57 62 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 1. Heritability rates of ADHD (Faraone & Biederman, 1998) 
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Figure 2. Diagram illustrating the complete hybrid model of executive functions (boxes) and the 
relationship of these four functions to the behavioural inhibition and motor control systems. 
From Barkley (1997a). 
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Probability Estimates for Congruency x Group x Response 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean probability estimates (%) for Congruency x Group x Response Instruction 
revealing a marginally significant 3-way interaction (p = .062), such that the ADHD group had 
significantly higher estimates relative to controls when resolving conflict problems with 
statistics.  Symmetrical response patterns for the control group on conflict problems illustrate 2-
way interference, such that interference from beliefs influences estimates when solving with 
statistics and interference from statistics influences estimates when solving with beliefs. Standard 
errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.   
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Probability Estimates for Group x Response Instruction 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean probability estimates (%) for Group x Response Instruction conditions.  The 
graph demonstrates an interaction (p = .039), such that the effect of the response instruction was 
reliably greater for the ADHD group relative to the control group.  Significantly higher 
accuracies of estimates were observed for the ADHD group when responding according to 
statistics, but not when responding with beliefs, whereas estimates for the control group were 
similar for both instruction conditions.  Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error 
bars attached to each column.   
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Figure 5. Histogram of probability estimates for control group participants when solving conflict 
problems under the statistics instruction.  The histogram shows the distribution to be 
approximately symmetric with skewness of –0.491 (SE = .299) and kurtosis of –0.983 (SE = 
.590), considered somewhat platykurtic. 
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Figure 6. Histogram of probability estimates for control group participants when solving conflict 
problems under the belief instruction.  The histogram shows the distribution to be moderately 
skewed to the left, with skewness of –0.992 (SE = .299) and kurtosis of .302 (SE = .590).  
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Figure 7. Histogram of probability estimates for ADHD group participants when solving conflict 
problems under the statistics instruction.  The histogram shows the distribution to be highly 
skewed to the left, with skewness of – 1.084 (SE = .299) and kurtosis of .298 (SE= .590). 
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Figure 8. Histogram of probability estimates for ADHD group participants when solving conflict 
problems under the belief instruction.  The histogram shows the distribution to be moderately 
skewed to the left, with skewness of –0.721 (SE = .299) and kurtosis of –0.464 (SE = .590), 
considered somewhat platykurtic. 
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Response Times (ms) for Congruency x Group x Response Instruction 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean RTs (ms) for Congruency x Group x Instruction revealing a 3-way interaction, 
such that the ADHD group had significantly longer response latencies relative to the control 
group when solving non-conflict problems with beliefs.  Standard errors are represented in the 
figure by the error bars attached to each column.   
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Response Times (ms) for Congruency x Group x Response Instruction 
 
 
Figure 10.  Deconstruction of the 3-way interaction (F(114) = 7.20, p = .008) for RTs for 
variables of Congruency x Group x Instruction.  A two-way ANOVA revealed conflict problems 
to have main effects of both group (F(1,119) = 4.17, p = .043) and instruction (F(1,119) = 12.77, 
p  = .001), but no interaction effects F(119) = .001, p = .979.  A second two-way ANOVA for 
non-conflict problems revealed no main effect of group (F(118) = 2.35, p = 1.28), but a main 
effect of instruction (F(1,118) = 15.37, p < .001), qualified by a two-way interaction between 
group and response instruction (F(1,118) = 9.32, p = .003).  Paired - tests revealed that the 
control group’s RT for non-conflict problems were similar for both belief and statistic 
instructions (t(61) = .715, p = .478).  However, the ADHD group had significantly longer RTs 
when resolving non-conflict problems with beliefs relative to statistics (t(57) = 4.33, p <.001). 
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Appendix A 
Study Invitation  
Posted as a general announcement on PAWS 
 
Participants needed for a 30 minute study on “Differences in Reasoning Performance.” 
Using the laboratory’s computer, participants will be asked to read, evaluate, and provide 
judgment decisions on 27 reasoning problems.  All responses will be confidential and no 
information will be linked to your identity or shared with others. 
 
A participation fee of $10.00 will be paid to complete the 30 minute reasoning task. 
 
Participants will be asked to pick one of the scheduled times provided for testing at the Social 
Science Research Laboratory, Room 256, 2nd Floor of the Arts and Science building at the 
University of Saskatchewan. 
 
To arrange an appointment to participate in this study, please email the researcher at 
maia.gibb@usask.ca 
 
If you have already participated in this study, you are not eligible to participate again. 
 
The study has been approved by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board. 
For more information, contact: 
Graduate Studies Researcher:  Maia Gibb, email: maia.gibb@usask.ca  
Research Supervisor: Dr. Laurie Hellsten, email: laurie.hellsen@usask.ca 
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Appendix B 
U of S Study Invitation 
 
This announcement was posted as a general bulletin on PAWS to recruit participants diagnosed 
with ADHD and also emailed to students registered at the university’s Disability Services for 
Students (DSS) as having ADHD.  Emails were sent directly by the DSS office on behalf of the 
researcher.  To protect students’ privacy, the researcher did not have access to the DSS 
database or email list. 
 
Have you been diagnosed with ADHD?   Do you have 30 minutes to participate in a study? 
 
We are seeking participants diagnosed with ADHD to partake in a study that explores 
“Reasoning Performance.” 
 
Using the laboratory’s computer, participants will be asked to read, evaluate, and provide 
judgment decisions on 27 reasoning problems.  All responses will be confidential and no 
information will be linked to your identity or shared with others.   
 
A participation fee of $10.00 will be paid to complete the 30 minute reasoning task. 
 
Participants will be asked to pick one of the scheduled times provided for testing at the Social 
Science Research Laboratory, Room 256, 2nd Floor of the Arts and Science building at the 
University of Saskatchewan.   
 
To arrange an appointment to participate in this study, please email the researcher at 
mkg639@mail.usask.ca 
 
If you are taking medication to control symptoms of ADHD, an appointment should be made 12 
- 24 hours after your last dose of medication, depending on how often the medication is taken.  
Flexible appointment times are available so as not to disrupt medication schedules.  For example, 
if you normally take medication for ADHD ONCE DAILY at 9 a.m., an appointment would 
ideally be scheduled at 9:00 p.m. the following day before the next dose of medication is due.  
Alternatively, if medication for ADHD is taken TWICE DAILY, an appointment would ideally 
be scheduled at least 12 hours after a taking ADHD medication but before the next dose is due to 
be taken. 
 
If you have already participated in this study, you are not eligible to participate again. 
The study has been approved by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board (BEH 
15-147) 
For more information, contact: 
 
Graduate Studies Researcher:  Maia Gibb, email: maia.gibb@usask.ca.    
Research Supervisor: Dr. Laurie Hellsten, email: laurie.hellsen@usask.ca. 
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Appendix C 
Consent Form 
Project Title:  
Differences in Reasoning Performance 
        
Researchers:  
Maia Gibb, Graduate Student, Educational Psychology and Special Education, University of 
Saskatchewan, maia.gibb@usask.ca 
 
Supervisor:  
Dr. Laurie Hellsten, Educational Psychology and Special Education, University of 
Saskatchewan, (306) 966-7723, laurie.hellsen@usask.ca  
 
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
The primary purpose of this study is to train the student-researcher in the methods of psycho-
educational research.  As well, we wish to examine differences in reasoning performance 
between individuals diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and those 
not having ADHD.  
 
Procedure: 
Using a computer, you will be asked to read and make judgment evaluations on two reasoning 
tasks.  In the first task, you are asked to evaluate 24 belief-logic problems, each of which 
describe a sample of people and provide a personality sketch of an individual drawn at random 
from the sample. The second task asks you to answer three logic questions.  At the end of the 
study, you will be provided a debriefing form.  This study should take approximately 30 minutes 
of your time. Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the 
study or your role, by e-mailing the researchers at the addresses listed above. 
 
Potential Risks:  
There are no known or anticipated physical, psychological, or social risks to you by participating 
in this research.  At the completion of the study, you will be given a sheet that explains the study 
in more detail and you will be provided the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
Compensation:  
You will receive a cash payment of $10.00 for your participation in the study.  If you choose to 
withdraw at any time during the study task, compensation for your services will be prorated 
based on the number of minutes of participation.   
 
Confidentiality:  
Your data will be kept completely confidential and no personally identifying information will be 
linked to your data.  Data will be coded using arbitrary participant numbers and will not be 
associated with any names or personally identifying information. All data will be summarized in 
a combined form.  
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Storage of Data:  
Data and consent forms will be stored separately in a secure location at the University of 
Saskatchewan by the researcher and research supervisor.  In instances where the data are 
published in an academic journal and/or presented at a professional conference, the data will be 
stored for a minimum of five years after completion of the study.  When the data are no longer 
required, they will be destroyed beyond recovery. 
 
Right to Withdraw:   
Your participation is voluntary and you may answer only those questions that you are 
comfortable with.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any time 
during the study task, without explanation or penalty.  You have the right to withdraw from the 
study at any time during the tasks, up until you have left the laboratory. Once you have 
completed the study and left, it is no longer possible to identify individual responses from the 
assigned numerical identity. 
 
If you withdraw at any time during the study task, partial compensation for your services will be 
provided at a prorated amount based on the number of minutes of participation.  If you choose to 
withdraw from study, you will be provided a debriefing form with information about the study 
and contact information, should you wish to contact the researchers.  Any data that you have 
contributed up until your decision to withdraw will be destroyed beyond recovery. 
 
Follow up:  
To obtain results from the study, please use the contact information given to you on the 
debriefing form.  The student-researcher would be more than happy to provide summarized 
results of the study to participants.  
 
Questions or Concerns:  
For any questions or concerns please contact the student-researchers using the information 
provided.  You may also contact the student-researcher by email:  maia.gibb@usask.ca or the 
research supervisor, Dr. Laurie Hellsten, Educational Psychology and Special Education, 
University of Saskatchewan, (306) 966-7723, laurie.hellsen@usask.ca.  Questions about your 
rights as a participant may be addressed to the Research Ethics Office at ethics.office@usask.ca 
or phone (306) 966-2975.  Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-2975.  
 
Signed Consent 
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understand the description provided:  I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and my/our questions have been answered.  I consent to 
participate in the research project. A copy of this Consent Form has been given to me for my 
records. 
 
     
Name of Participant  Signature  Date 
   
   
 
Researcher Signature    Date 
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Appendix D 
Debriefing Form 
The primary purpose of this study is to train the student-researcher in the methods of psycho-
educational research.  The secondary purpose of this study is to examine differences in reasoning 
performance between individuals diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and those not having ADHD.  It is hypothesized that individuals diagnosed with ADHD 
will have more difficulty when solving belief-based probability problems using statistics in 
comparison to those without ADHD.  This hypothesis is derived from research demonstrating 
that a key functional area of the brain implicated in ADHD is the same cortical area normally 
activated when an erroneous response requires suppression in analytic (logical) reasoning. 
 
To test this, we designed an experiment asking participants to give an estimate on the probability 
or likelihood of group membership.  Participants evaluated 24 problems, each of which provided 
information about the composition of a particular sample (e.g., 4 doctors and 996 nurses) and a 
stereotypical description of one individual drawn from that sample.  These problems varied in 
the proportion of individuals that belonged to one of the two groups.  In some cases the 
description of the individual in the problem matched the presented base-rates of group 
membership (non-conflict problems).  In other cases, the description conflicted with the 
presented base-rates of group membership (conflict problems).  Participants were instructed to 
solve the problems using either “statistics” or “beliefs.”  Responses were given in free time in the 
form of a probability estimate.  Based on previous research, we anticipate that when individuals 
with ADHD are asked to solve conflict problems by way of “statistics,” they will have more 
difficulty than the control group in inhibiting the erroneous “belief” response cued by the 
stereotypical description.   
 
The data will be used as the basis for a master’s thesis in educational psychology to better 
understand how individuals with ADHD perform in logical/probability reasoning on applied 
problems as compared to individuals without ADHD.  Your data will be kept completely 
confidential and no personally identifying information will be linked to your data.  Normally, the 
data will be destroyed once the thesis has been completed.  In instances where the data are 
published in an academic journal and/or presented at a professional conference, the data will be 
stored for a minimum of five years after completion of the study.  When the data are no longer 
required, it will be destroyed beyond recovery. 
 
If you have any concerns or questions about this research, please feel free to contact the student-
researcher: Maia Gibb, email: mkg639@mail.usask.ca.  Alternatively, you may also contact the 
supervisor, Dr. Laurie Hellsten, email: laurie.hellsen@usask.ca, or phone (306) 966-7723. 
 
You are also encouraged to contact the researchers for a copy of the results which should be 
available by October, 2016. Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be 
addressed to the Behavioural Research Ethics board through the Research Ethics Office at 
ethics.office@usask.ca, or by calling (306) 966-2975. Out of town participants call toll free (888) 
966-2975.  Thank you again for helping us with this research. 
 
 131 
 
Appendix E 
Experimental Stimuli Study Task 1 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Jack is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 5 engineers 
and 995 lawyers.  
Jack is 36 years old. He is not 
married and is somewhat 
introverted. He likes to spend his 
free time reading science fiction 
and writing computer programs. 
What is the 
probability that 
Jack is a 
lawyer? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Kurt is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 3 who live in 
a condo and 997 who 
live in a farmhouse.  
Kurt works on Wall Street and is 
single. He works long hours and 
wears Armani suits to work. He 
likes wearing sunglasses. 
What is the 
probability that 
Kurt lives in a 
farmhouse? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Paul is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 997 nurses 
and 3 doctors.  
Paul is 34 years old. He lives in a 
beautiful home in a posh suburb. 
He is well spoken and very 
interested in politics. He invests a 
lot of time in his career. 
What is the 
probability that 
Paul is a 
doctor? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Jessie is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of the 
study.  
Among the participants 
there were 996 women 
and 4 men.  
Jessie is 23 years old and is 
finishing a degree in engineering. 
On Friday nights, Jessie likes to 
go out with friends and listen to 
loud music and drink beer.  
What is the 
probability that 
Jessie is a 
man? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Jeremy is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 4 whose 
favorite series is Star 
Trek and 996 whose 
favorite series is Days of 
our Lives.  
Jeremy is 26 and is doing 
graduate studies in physics. He 
stays at home most of the time 
and likes to play video-games. 
What is the 
probability that 
Jeremy's 
favorite series 
is Days of Our 
Lives? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Ellen is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 995 fifty-year 
olds and 5 sixteen-year 
olds.  
Ellen likes to listen to hip hop and 
rap music. She enjoys wearing 
tight shirts and jeans. She's fond 
of dancing and has a small nose 
piercing. 
What is the 
probability that 
Ellen is 
sixteen? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested.  Karen is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 5 who buy 
their clothes at Wal-Mart 
and 995 who buy their 
clothes at high-end 
retailers. 
Karen is a 33-year-old female. 
She works in a business office and 
drives a Porsche. She lives in a 
fancy penthouse with her 
boyfriend. 
What is the 
probability that 
Karen buys her 
clothes at Wal-
Mart? 
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In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Kelly is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 3 boys and 
997 girls.  
Kelly is 13 years old. Kelly’s 
favorite subject is art. Kelly’s 
favorite things to do are shopping 
and having sleepovers with 
friends to gossip about other kids 
at school. 
What is the 
probability that 
Kelly is a boy? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Jay is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 997 who have 
a tattoo and 3 without a 
tattoo.  
Jay is a 29-year-old male. He has 
served a short time in prison. He 
has been living on his own for 2 
years now. He has an older car 
and listens to punk music. 
What is the 
probability that 
Jay has a 
tattoo? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Lilly is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 996 
kindergarten teachers 
and 4 executive 
managers.  
Lilly is 37 years old. She is 
married and has 3 kids. Her 
husband is a veterinarian. She is 
committed to her family and 
always watches the daily cartoon 
shows with her kids. 
What is the 
probability that 
Lilly is a 
kindergarten 
teacher? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Tara is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Among the participants 
there were 4 Bruce 
Springsteen fans and 996 
Britney Spears fans.  
Tara is 15. She loves to go 
shopping at the mall and to talk 
with her friends about their 
crushes at school. 
What is the 
probability that 
Tara is a Bruce 
Springsteen 
fan? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Martine is 
a randomly 
chosen participant 
of this study 
Among the participants 
there were 995 French 
people and 5 Americans.  
Martine is 26 years old. She is 
bilingual and reads a lot in her 
spare time. She is a very 
fashionable dresser and a great 
cook. 
What is the 
probability that 
Martine is 
French? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Brannon is 
a randomly 
chosen participant 
of this study. 
Brannon is 29 years old. 
He is very good with 
numbers but is shy 
around people. He 
spends much of his time 
working. 
Among the participants there were 
5 accountants and 995 street 
artists.  
What is the 
probability that 
Brannon is an 
accountant? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Floyd is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Floyd 40 years old. He is 
an imaginative person 
and enjoys street theatre. 
He loves experimenting 
with different types of 
food.  
Among the participants there were 
3 artists and 997 consultants.  
What is the 
probability that 
Floyd is an 
artist? 
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In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Geraldine 
is a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Geraldine is 41 years old. 
She loves books and 
spends a lot of her free 
time reading. She enjoys 
helping her two children 
with their homework. 
Among the participants there 
were 997 drummers and 3 
librarians.  
What is the 
probability 
that Geraldine 
is a drummer? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Tyrone is 
a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Tyrone is 27 years old. All 
his friends consider him 
very brave and he is in 
relatively good physical 
shape. He goes to the gym 
regularly. 
Among the participants there 
were 996 managers and 4 
firemen.  
What is the 
probability 
that Tyrone is 
a manager? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Hank is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Hank is 42 years old. He is 
a creative and introverted 
person. He considers his 
home computer his most 
prized possession.  
Among the participants there 
were 4 writers and 996 
construction workers.  
What is the 
probability 
that Hank is a 
writer? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Molly is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Molly is 25 years old. She 
is very healthy and she 
works out at least five 
times a week. She enjoys 
pop music and dancing. 
Among the participants there 
were 995 researchers and 5 
aerobics instructors.  
What is the 
probability 
that Molly is a 
researcher? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Richard is 
a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Richard is 56 years old. He 
is a good public speaker 
and is good at meeting 
people. He is a top notch 
debater and can argue both 
sides of an issue with ease. 
Among the participants there 
were 5 I.T. Technicians and 
995 politicians.  
What is the 
probability 
that Richard is 
a politician? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Lucius is 
a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Lucius is 34 years old. He 
is pretty aggressive and 
tends to get involved in bar 
fights more than the 
average person. He 
recently got divorced.  
Among the participants there 
were 3 hippies and 997 boxers.  
What is the 
probability 
that Lucius is 
a boxer? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Dianna is 
a randomly 
chosen 
Dianna is 59 years old. She 
loves children and has 
been employed at her 
current job for 7 years. She 
enjoys drinking tea and 
Among the participants there 
were 997 nannies and 3 
telemarketers.  
What is the 
probability 
that Dianna is 
a 
telemarketer? 
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participant of this 
study. 
visiting with family and 
friends. 
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In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. George is 
a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
George is 36 years old. He 
is very intelligent and has 
nerves of steel. He has 
great hand-eye 
coordination. 
Among the participants there 
were 996 airplane pilots and 4 
shop assistants.  
What is the 
probability 
that George is 
a shop 
assistant? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Corinne is 
a randomly 
chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Corinne is 32 years old. 
She is a great organizer 
and always dresses neatly. 
She loves talking to her 
friends and family on the 
phone. 
Among the participants there 
were 4 gardeners and 996 
secretaries.  
What is the 
probability 
that Corinne 
is a secretary? 
In a study 1000 
people were 
tested. Dan is a 
randomly chosen 
participant of this 
study. 
Dan is 30 years old. He is a 
good driver and a takes his 
job very seriously. He is 
married, but has no 
children.   
Among the participants there 
were 995 paramedics and 5 
clowns.  
What is the 
probability 
that Dan is a 
clown? 
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Appendix F 
Counterbalancing Format 
Conflict Problems  (12 problems total) 
(description matches smaller base-rate) 
Non-Conflict problems (12 problems total)    
(description matches larger base-rate) 
Instructed to Respond with Statistics Instructed to Respond with Statistics 
Represented in Set One as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in third  sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Three as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in third  sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Two as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks  probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Four as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks  probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Five as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is an engineer 
Base-rates presented in third sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Six as: 
955 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is an 
engineer 
Base-rates presented in third sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Seven as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Questions asks probability person is an 
engineer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
Represented in Set Eight as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Questions asks probability person is an 
engineer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using statistics 
 
 
 
Conflict Problems 
(description matches smaller base-rate) 
Non-Conflict problems  
(description matches larger base-rate) 
Instructed to Respond with Beliefs Instructed to Respond with Beliefs 
Represented in Set Nine as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in third  sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Eleven as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in third  sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Ten as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks  probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Twelve as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks  probability person is a lawyer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
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Represented in Set Thirteen as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is an engineer 
Base-rates presented in third sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Fourteen as: 
955 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Question asks probability person is an  engineer 
Base-rates presented in third sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Fifteen as: 
5 Engineers vs. 995 Lawyers 
Questions asks probability person is an engineer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
Represented in Set Sixteen as: 
995 Engineers vs. 5 Lawyers 
Questions asks probability person is an engineer 
Base-rates presented in fourth sentence 
Instructions to respond using belief 
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Appendix G 
Experimental Stimuli Study Task 2 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost?   
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets?  
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake?  
 
